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BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING: THE REALITY SHOW
YOU DIDN’T AUDITION FOR
J. AMY DILLARD*
Even if one cannot expect total privacy while alone in [an open
field] . . . this diminished privacy interest does not eliminate
society’s expectation to be protected from the severe intrusion of
having the government monitor private activities through hidden
video cameras.1
Introduction
In the winter of 2006, a woman set out on a hike across her neighbor’s
working farm.2 The farm stretched for hundreds of acres, with major portions
completely hidden by trees from adjacent public or other private property.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., Washington
and Lee University Law School; B.A., Wellesley College. I thank Dean Phil Closius and the
University of Baltimore School of Law for the generous support of this Article. I thank
Professors Garrett Epps, Steve Grossman, Penny Pether, and Arnold Rochvarg for their patient
mentoring and thoughtful comments. I thank Cheryl Jones for her impeccable work as my
research assistant and Daniel New-Schneider for being an engaged student who piqued my
interest in this issue. I thank John Jacob, Archivist at the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, and the
library staff at Washington and Lee University Law School for granting access to the Archives
and for their assistance with my research. I thank Joe Michael for educating me on small game
hunting and birds of prey. As always, I thank Karen Woody for helping me with most
everything.
1. United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. The facts in the first two paragraphs of this Article arose in the pre-trial hearing and
trial of Steven Vankesteren before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Norfolk Division, in Criminal Action No. 2:07cr153. At that hearing and trial, Mr.
Vankesteren was not represented by counsel. The totality of the facts is best captured in Mr.
Vankesteren’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, which
includes the transcript from the entirety of his hearing and trial. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Vankesteren v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2743 (2009) (No. 08-1253), 2009 WL
979654 [hereinafter, Petition for Certiorari]. The Fourth Circuit also offers a detailed recitation
of facts in its opinion. See United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2743 (2009). The Author, along with Matthew Haynie and Karen Woody,
then associates at Bracewell and Giuliani, LLP, represented Mr. Vankesteren in his Petition for
Certiorari. The Author’s personal notes, taken between January 9, 2009, and April, 8, 2009,
during extensive interviews with Mr. Vankesteren, add some of the additional detail presented
in this Article; for the purpose of a full examination of the case, the facts as recited in this
Article are intended to be more complete and detailed than what the Court considered. See
Author’s Personal Notes (2009) (on file with author).
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During her hour-long, trespassory hike through the posted, private property,3
she stumbled upon several large metal traps with dead birds inside. When she
returned home, she called the local game warden4 and reported that she
believed that the trapped birds were red-tailed hawks.5
The game warden investigated the tip6 by driving onto the posted, private
property, into an area well out of sight of any adjacent private or public
property. Over the course of the next month, he entered the property nine
times, and each time he drove to the area of the reported traps;7 each time that
he entered the property, he left quickly to avoid being seen by the farm’s
owner.8 The first several times that he entered the property, the game warden
observed the traps but never saw a protected bird in any trap. After his
unsuccessful attempts to catch the farmer with a protected bird in his traps, the
game warden installed a sophisticated, stop-action, motion-sensing video
camera, and he trained the camera on the area where the traps sat.9 For
thirteen days, the camera recorded any movement within its view, including,
among other things, video images of the farmer walking hand-in-hand with a
companion, of the farmer urinating, of a flock of turkeys strutting by, and, on
two occasions, of the farmer removing a red-tailed hawk from a trap and

3. The phrase “posted, private property,” has a special significance in criminal law.
Prosecution for trespassing requires proof of the defendant’s mental state, i.e., “that the actor
be aware of the fact that he is making an unwarranted intrusion.” WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
LAW §21.2(C) (West 5th ed. 2010). Proof that a defendant entered property that was clearly
posted as private and with a trespassing prohibition can satisfy proof of intent. Most states have
incorporated this method of proof into their trespassing statutes. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-119 (1998).
4. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d at 287.
5. Red-tailed hawks are migratory birds protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
which makes it unlawful to trap or kill red-tailed hawks without a permit. 16 U.S.C. § 703
(2004); 50 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2008). Gamekeepers engaged in a small game hunting enterprise
might trap and kill red-tailed hawks and other birds of prey to protect the natural game, such
as rabbits, quail, and pheasants. Red-tailed hawks often fly into gun fire during a shoot with
pen-raised pheasant because a red-tailed hawk can catch and kill a full-grown pheasant midflight. Like planting and harvesting to attract game birds or creating and maintaining natural
cover for rabbit warrens, trapping birds of prey is a conservation effort by small game hunters.
See Author’s personal notes, May 9, 2011, from an interview with Joseph S. Michael,
proprietor, Whistling Hill Regulated Shooting Area, Boonsboro, Maryland.
6. Though the tip received by the game warden was anonymous, after speaking with a
neighbor, Mr. Vankesteren learned that she had reported the traps to the game warden. See
Author’s Personal Notes, supra note 2.
7. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 2, at 37a-40a.
8. Id. at 36a.
9. Id. at 38a.
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wringing its neck.10 The game warden arrested the farmer, and he was
convicted in federal district court of violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.11
In 1984, at the height of the Reagan-era war on drugs, the Supreme Court
created a bright-line exception12 to Fourth Amendment protection by declaring
that no person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area defined as an
open field.13 When it created the exception, the Court ignored positive law and
its own jurisprudence that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.14
The open fields doctrine allows law enforcement officers to enter posted,
private areas that are not part of a house or its curtilage15 for brief
surveillance.16 The Supreme Court has never “extended the open fields
doctrine to anything beyond observation searches,”17 nor has the Court ever
authorized hidden video surveillance on private property without prior
authorization by warrant or consent.18 The Fourth Circuit, however, recently
extended the open fields doctrine to authorize sustained video surveillance.19
This new extension of a constitutionally authorized intrusion has resulted in
a significant diminution in the rights of property owners to exclude
government agents from their property and to be free from the probing eye and
constant videotaping of the government on private property.
10. Author’s Personal Notes, supra note 2, which were taken while watching the videotape
that was admitted into evidence by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Norfolk Division.
11. See United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2743 (2009).
12. The Court is generally critical of bright-line rules in its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. See e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“But the Fourth Amendment does not insist upon bright-line rules. Rather, it recognizes that
no single sets of legal rules can capture the ever-changing complexity of human life. It
consequently uses the general terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’ And the Court has
continuously emphasized that ‘[r]easonableness...is measured...by examining the totality of the
circumstances.’” [citations omitted]).
13. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
14. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
15. The general test used by the Court to determine whether a space is curtilage or an open
field employs four factors: 1) proximity of the area to the home; 2) whether the area is enclosed
along with the home; 3) how the area is used by the resident; and 4) steps taken by the resident
to protect the area from observation. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 292 (1987).
16. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178-79.
17. Husband v. Bryan, 946 F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1991).
18. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
19. See United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2743 (2009) (holding that warrentless, long-term, trespassory videotaping on posted, private
property does not violate the Fourth Amendment protection of citizens to be free from
unreasonable searches).
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Upper-level law students struggle mightily to resolve the Court’s open
fields doctrine with other rules of law. In Torts, students learn that the bending
of a single blade of grass is a sufficient damage to justify liability against a
trespasser.20 In Property, they learn that owners must move to eject squatters
from their property in order to avoid an adverse possession claim.21 In
Criminal Law, they learn that trespass is a lesser-included offense to common
law burglary.22 Typically in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,23 just before
students study the open fields doctrine, they read Katz v. United States,24
which offers the contemporary, expansive understanding that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. But in Oliver v. United States,25 the
leading case endorsing the open fields doctrine, the Court rejected the bulk of
these various bodies of common and constitutional law to establish a brightline exception26 to Fourth Amendment protection. In United States v.
Vankesteren,27 the Fourth Circuit extended the bright-line exception created by
the open fields doctrine to authorize governmental video surveillance of a
citizen’s actions on his posted, private property.28
This Article first maintains that the Supreme Court based its decision in
Oliver on an open fields doctrine that had been established in a formalist
opinion, which lacked any substantive analysis by the Court.29 Next, the
20. See Dougherty v. North Carolina, 18 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 371 (N.C. 1835)
(holding that “it is an elementary principle, that every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful
entry, into the close of another is trespass”).
21. See Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) (offering a broad
overview of the rights of owners against claims of adverse possession).
22. See LAFAVE, supra note 3.
23. See, e.g., J OSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE THOMAS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATING CRIME (4th ed. 2010); STEPHEN SALTZBURG & DANIEL C APRA, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND COMMENTARY (9th ed. 2010).
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
26. Again, the Court generally steers clear of bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment
analysis, preferring instead to rely on “the officials’ ability to evaluate the intangible indicia of
criminality effectively and accurately, or to make tactical decisions based upon bringing
pragmatic skills or expertise to bear.” See Eric J. Miller, Putting Practice Into Theory, 7 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 31, 52 (2009). The Oliver majority, to the contrary, rejects the idea that law
enforcement officials benefit from training and experience in their ability to employ
sophisticated rules. “Under this [case-by-case] approach, police officers would have to guess
before every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted a sufficient
number of warning signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a
right of privacy.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181.
27. United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2743 (2009).
28. Id.
29. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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Article argues that, in Oliver, the Court should have engaged in an honest
review of the open fields doctrine, unhindered by the formalist commands
from an early generation, in light of the newer Katz rule that required an
assessment of whether a defendant can maintain a justifiable expectation of
privacy on vast acreage that is well-marked against trespassers with signs and
fencing.30 Because the premise of the majority opinion in Oliver is that open
fields deserve no protection from the probing governmental eye, the reasoning
offered therein remains unreconciled with the Court’s dominant Fourth
Amendment doctrine articulated in Katz.. Finally, the Article maintains that
the doctrine in Oliver lacks any vision of a future replete with invasive
technology,31 and while the Fourth Circuit correctly applied the flawed open
fields doctrine, it dangerously extended the authorization of government agents
to use hidden video surveillance on posted, private property.32 In a world full
of modern technology, the least intrusive of which may be constant, hidden
video surveillance, this Article criticizes an unfettered open fields doctrine and
the government excesses and incursions that may infringe upon a citizen’s
justifiable expectation of privacy.
The Article proceeds in five parts beginning with an overview of the
majority opinion in Oliver and of the detailed dissent authored by Justice
Thurgood Marshall; this part offers a critique that the majority opinion lacks
a coherent, consistent legal theory to support the open fields doctrine. In Part
Two, the Article reexamines the historical basis for the open fields doctrine
and demonstrates that the issue is more complex than the Oliver majority
acknowledges. In Part Three, the Article views Oliver through the pragmatic
lens of its time and assesses whether the pragmatic justifications for the
outcome are still as pressing today. In Part Four, the Article assesses the
danger to individual expectations of privacy by critiquing the open fields
doctrine in light of the prevailing “technology doctrines.” In Conclusion, the
Article theorizes the dangers of per se rules within Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and argues for a flexible open fields doctrine that allows for a
case-by-case assessment which can weigh privacy rights against governmental
interests.
30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlen, J., concurring).
31. Surveillance, whether physical or transactional, has come to the forefront in recent
Fourth Amendment scholarship, though the Oliver Court does not anticipate constant video
surveillance. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004); Orin Kerr, The
National Surveillance State: A Response to Balkin, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2179 (2009); Peter Swire,
Proportionality for High Tech Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 751 (2009).
32. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d at 286.
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I. The Lack of a Coherent, Consistent Legal Theory to Support the Open
Fields Doctrine
The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence falls into two main
categories: discerning what constitutes a search, and reflecting on the
reasonableness of searches. In both areas, the law is confusing at its best and
“illogical, inconsistent, unprincipled, ad hoc, and theoretically incoherent”33
at its worst. This Article focuses on the former category – discerning what
constitutes a search. When the Court concludes that government action does
not constitute a search—as in the open fields doctrine—it does not reach the
issue of reasonableness. A review of the case law supports the common
assertion that in the past fifty years, the Court has largely applied the theory
of legal pragmatism34 to its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. But as it shifted
from its previous approach, legal formalism,35 to its current approach, legal
pragmatism,36 the Court had to reject its prior constrained interpretations of the
33. Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory,
41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 204 (1998). Professor Cloud establishes that the community of legal
scholars and dissenting Justices routinely criticize the Court’s majority opinions for inconsistent
application of its own rules. Id. at 204 n.10.
34. This Article does not survey the nuances of legal pragmatism. As a theory, legal
pragmatism espouses that the law is not foundational but that it is a living instrument that can
be used to solve social problems; its application is necessarily contextual. See generally
RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2010); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE (1993). The most succinct summary of legal pragmatism belongs to Professor
Morgan Cloud: “[The law] is something that judges, lawyers, and legislators make.” Cloud,
supra note 33, at 210-11.
35. I am accepting the conventional views of legal formalism, and I make no effort to offer
any analysis of its tenets. At its most basic level, legal formalism adheres to the meaningful
nature of legal rules and seeks to apply the rules to factual situations. Formalism is the standard
approach in first-year legal writing courses, where students learn to find rules, synthesize rules,
and apply rules. For an excellent example of formalism in practice, see Frederick Schauer, A
Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109 (2008). For further study, see
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 514 (1988) (tracing formalism to the theories
of H.L.A. Hart); Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 817
(1989) (tracing formalism to Christopher Langdell’s view that law is a science filled with
principles and doctrine).
36. Cloud, supra note 33 at 205. I accept Professor Cloud’s assertion that the Court shifted
from legal formalism to legal pragmatism between the early- and mid-twentieth century.
Perhaps the best evidence is the Court’s own sheepishness when it engages in retro-formalism.
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006) (holding that one co-tenant can bar the
police from entering a dwelling when another co-tenant consents, the Court wrote, “[t]his is the
line we draw, and we think the formalism is justified”). Though I accept the general shift to
pragmatism, I remain interested in ways to catalogue the Court’s pragmatism into some reliable,
predictable form that demonstrates intellectual consistency. See Orin Kerr, Four Models of

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss3/2

2011]

THE REALITY SHOW YOU DIDN’T AUDITION FOR

467

Fourth Amendment. Chief among those was a shift from a view that the
Fourth Amendment should be interpreted in light of conventional property
law37 to a more expansive notion that the Amendment “protects people, not
places.”38 The concept that falls most squarely into the breach between
formalism and pragmatism is the open fields doctrine. In Oliver, the Court
fails to comport with either legal theory, in that it bows to formalism by
accepting precedent that was incomplete in its historical review, then it offers
a limited, constrained reconciliation with the newer Katz model.39
A. The Tired Formalism of Oliver v. United States
The open fields doctrine was first established in Hester v. United States,40
in which the Court held that a government agent’s seizure of abandoned
personal property on an open field did not violate the Fourth Amendment.41
In two ways the Hester Court rejected the defendant’s claim: first, it declared
that abandoned property was not protected by the Fourth Amendment, and
second, it found that a government agent’s entry onto an open field did not
invoke Fourth Amendment analysis at all because the intrusion did not
constitute a search.42 Perhaps ironically, it was Oliver Wendell Holmes,
regarded as the father of legal realism,43 who issued the formalist proclamation
in Hester: “the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the
Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 516-19 (2007).
37. See Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
39. Professor Cloud finds the Court’s reasoning in Oliver, “plausible, but far from
irrefutable.” Cloud, supra note 33, at 255. I find the Court’s rote, formalist adoption of the
open fields doctrine unpersuasive, and its attempt to reconcile the doctrine, through legal
pragmatism, with more contemporary law, specious at best. That it employs rigid formalism
then tries to reconcile its pragmatic precedent reveals a troubling lack of analytical rigor.
40. See 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
41. See id. at 58.
42. See id. at 57-58.
43. For a contemporary summation of the Legal Realists’ theories of law, see Michael
Steven Green, Legal Realism as a Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1921-39
(2005); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 267 (1997). The most famous demonstration of Holmes’ legal realism philosophy
springs from the first page of his The Common Law: “The life of the law has not been logic; it
has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Common Law 1 (Barnes & Noble
2004) (1909).
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people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the
open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the
common law.”44 The Court continued to clarify the doctrine in subsequent
cases throughout the early twentieth century,45 culminating with its decision
in Oliver v. United States in 1984.46
In Oliver and its companion case, Maine v. Thornton,47 the Court defined
“government intrusion” by the facts of the two cases. In each case, an officer
received information that the defendant might be growing marijuana in the
fields near his home;48 further, officers disregarded “No Trespassing” signs,
walked into and through areas bordered by private fencing, and traveled some
distance by foot through the private property to discover a marijuana field.49
The Court concluded in the first order that open fields are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment based on the rule from Hester.50
Although the Court primarily relied on a textual analysis of the Fourth
Amendment,51 the majority attempted to reconcile other constitutional
doctrines that should have prevented a purely textual analysis.52 Further, in its
formalist adoption of the open fields precedent, the Court elided centuries of
trespass analysis53 in its rejection of a common-sense and common-law
approach to the open fields doctrine. In so doing, the Court offered a cursory
nod to the Framers’ intent in drafting the Fourth Amendment, but disregarded
44. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *223, *225-26).
45. The Court modified or overruled the holding in each of those cases when it decided
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
46. 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding that the open fields doctrine remained unmodified by the
Court’s justifiable expectation of privacy doctrine established in Katz).
47. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
48. Id. at 173-75.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 176.
51. Much as Justice Holmes had in Hester. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. The majority opinion simply fails to address Justice Marshall’s criticism, in dissent, that
“we do not construe constitutional provisions of this sort the way we do statutes, whose drafters
can be expected to indicate with some comprehensiveness and exactitude the conduct they wish
to forbid or control and to change the provisions when they become obsolete.” See Oliver at
186-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (comparing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
407 (1819)).
53. I trust Justice Scalia that trespass analysis should be at the cornerstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis. “From the date of its ratification until well into the 20th century,
violation of the Amendment was tied to common-law trespass.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S.
103, 143 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the complexity and vigor of the debates over the meaning and importance of
property in Fourth Amendment analysis. Moreover, even in its textual
analysis, the Court drifted toward the dominant Fourth Amendment doctrines
of the time. The Court tied its determination of what the Framers intended to
protect in the Fourth Amendment to the fact that each defendant sought to
conceal his criminal activities by planting marijuana upon secluded land and
behind fences and “No Trespassing” signs.54
Before 1967, the Court focused its Fourth Amendment analysis on whether
a government agent had trespassed into an area protected by the plain text of
the Amendment.55 The Court often examined whether government actors had
crossed physical thresholds into areas protected by the plain language of the
Fourth Amendment56 to determine whether a violation had occurred.57 This
narrow construction of the Fourth Amendment satisfied most situations until
telephone wiretapping became more and more prevalent.58
When the Oliver majority addressed whether the Fourth Amendment
protected an open field it relied on an “old” locational theory59 case in the first
order, Hester v. United States,60 where the Court found a ready answer to the
question by relying on the plain text of the Amendment.61 The Hester Court
54. Id. at 182.
55. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Of interest, Olmstead is
a Prohibition-era case that offered the Court its first opportunity to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment protects private telephone conversations from government eavesdropping
without a warrant. In a 5-4 decision, the Court declared that, when the government does not
actually trespass onto private property, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment by
eavesdropping on telephone conversations. See id. Thus, the warrantless wiretap was not
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment so long as the eavesdropping occurred somewhere along
the telephone wires outside of the home.
56. The Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
57. In the most memorable of these cases, the Court decided that a “spike mic,” which had
been pushed through the wall from an adjoining row house to monitor the defendant’s
conversations, had “trespassed,” ever so slightly, into the defendant’s home and was, thus, a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)
(“[T]he eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into
the premises occupied by the petitioners.”).
58. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
59. Locational theory is the term employed by Justice Marshall to describe the pre-Katz
method of analyzing Fourth Amendment claims. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 187.
60. See 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
61. Id. at 59. “As to that, it is enough to say that, apart from the justification, the special
protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers,
and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the
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found that only when government agents crossed the threshold of a protected
area might the Court have found a violation.
Hester is factually distinct from Oliver, though the Oliver majority did not
heed the distinction. Justice Powell’s wholesale reliance on Hester, without
acknowledging the difference, resulted in an incomplete analysis.62 In Hester,
federal revenue officers seized abandoned jugs and bottles that contained
illegal liquor.63 That the officers may have seized the abandoned contraband
on private property was not the central issue in the case; the abandonment
drove the analysis.64 Justice Holmes shared his views on the distinction
between the houses and fields in dicta, though it seems clear that he was
unconvinced that the examination of the contraband took place on private
property.65 Justice Powell, however, turned Holmes’ dicta into a rule by
simply declaring it to be one.66 Holmes decided the case by disposing of
Petitioner’s arguments in turn.67 He found that the testimony from the
defendant was not obtained by an illegal search and seizure, that the

former is as old as the common law.” Id. This quotation represents the entirety of the Court’s
analysis of the open fields issue in Hester. Justice Holmes cites Blackstone’s Commentaries
in support of his bold assertion, though the citations he offers, 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *223, *225-26, deal with burglary of the home, and seem, at best, to offer
oblique support for the declaration.
62. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 194 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 176 n.6 (majority
opinion) (arguing that the rule in Hester is not limited to the facts in Hester).
63. 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).
64. Id. While the evidence is unclear, the Court assumed, “on the strength of the pursuing
officer’s” testimony, that the agents in Hester concealed themselves on private property to
observe the exterior of a house where a moonshining sales operation was run out of a South
Carolina farm. The Court disposes of the trespass issue by concluding that “even if there had
been a trespass,” the observations of the agents had not been obtained by illegal search or
seizure. Id. There is no other indication that the officers’ vantage point was from private
property or that, if private, it was posted to exclude trespassers. See also Oliver, 466 U.S. at
194 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59 (“The only shadow of a ground for bringing up the case is drawn
from the hypothesis that the examination of the vessels took place upon Hester’s father’s
land.”).
66. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176 (“The rule announced in Hester v. United States was founded
upon the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment.”). The declarations of law by Justice
Holmes often have extraordinary meaning, and a review of Justice Powell’s case file from
Oliver reveals that the dicta of Justice Holmes in Hester had significant meaning simply because
it was the dicta of Justice Holmes. Justice Powell took handwritten notes at the Oliver
Conference, and under the heading “Justice Blackmun” he wrote, “Clerks want to reverse
Hester until they remember who wrote it.” 82-15 Oliver v. United States, Supreme Court Case
Files, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University
School of Law (copy on file with author).
67. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58.
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defendant’s own acts revealed the location of the abandoned contraband, that
no evidence was obtained by entry into the house, and that examination of
abandoned evidence did not constitute a seizure.68 When he finally turned to
the open fields question, he suggested that there was insufficient evidence to
even consider the claim, noting “the hypothesis that the examination of the
vessels took place upon Hester’s father’s land.”69
Because the Court later rejected the narrowness of locational analysis, any
reliance on Hester should have been limited. If the Oliver Court wished to
remain true to its pre-Katz formalistic approach, however, it could have
concluded that Oliver and Thornton’s open fields were not part of the
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” protected by the Fourth Amendment,
and, like the Hester Court, ended its inquiry there. Entry into an unprotected
area by a government agent does not demand any Fourth Amendment analysis
under this rationale, and if the majority had been willing to assert this rule
completely, it would not have needed to engage in any further analysis.
B. A New Understanding: The Fourth Amendment Protects People, Not
Places
The Court largely rejected the narrowness of locational theory in 1967 when
it began to view the Fourth Amendment more broadly; since then, the Court
has consistently declared, “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”70 The Court shifted its focus in Fourth Amendment doctrine when it
rejected the strict confines of trespass71 analysis in favor of a more flexible
doctrine in Katz v. United States.72 While there is vigorous debate among
68. Id.
69. Id. at 59. That Holmes finds insufficient evidence of trespassing in Hester is radically
important, given his opinion in Olmstead v. United States. In Olmstead, Holmes joined the
dissent in finding that the evidence obtained by a wiretap should not have been admitted into
evidence. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
Rather than engage in head-on constitutional analysis, Holmes employs an evidentiary policy
rationale. See id. He maintains that the government should not be allowed to use evidence that
is obtainable only by a criminal act. He famously wrote, “We have to choose, and for my part
I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part.” Id. Given this philosophy from Holmes, that the government should not be
allowed to rely on evidence obtained by an illegal act, such as trespassing, had Holmes been on
the bench when Oliver was decided, he may well have been overwhelmed by the blatant
trespassory conduct of the officers and joined Justice Marshall in dissent.
70. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9.
71. Trespass here refers to the entry into or interference with “persons, houses, effects, and
papers” as set out in Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456.
72. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). If Hester relies on a locational theory for its interpretation of the
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scholars73 as to the impact that Katz has had on Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, Katz is offered in textbooks as a starting point for the
“expectation of privacy” doctrine that has permeated constitutional criminal
procedure in the last forty years.74 Read at its most narrow, Katz is merely
another wiretapping case—albeit one that cements an understanding that
warrantless wiretaps violate the Fourth Amendment.75 The Oliver Court,
however, read Katz as more and as a result, it struggled to acknowledge, yet
subsequently reject, the importance of Katz in any Fourth Amendment
question that involves a determination of which places are protected from
government interference.76
In Katz, the Court declared that the Fourth Amendment “protects people,
not places,” and concluded that a telephone conversation within a public phone
booth was the kind of activity that a person “seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public,” and, thus, that it deserved constitutional
protection.77
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion has produced the
subsequently paradigmatic rule from the case, that a person must exhibit “an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’.”78 Justice Harlan’s
rule, though, is limited to the facts of Katz, as demonstrated by his own
application. He opined that “conversations in the open would not be protected
against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the
circumstances would be unreasonable.”79 Most scholars agree that tying the
Fourth Amendment, some would argue that Katz overrules it, though in the form of a critique.
See Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology
and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5 (2002). Others argue that Katz offered very little
change in the property-based reasoning in Olmstead. See Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra
note 31, at 808-15.
73. For a clear, concise overview of the debates among scholars see David Alan Sklansky,
"One Train May Hide Another": Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 883 (2008).
74. Constitutional Criminal procedure textbooks typically offer Katz as the first case in the
chapter that addresses what constitutes a search. See, e.g., J OSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C.
THOMAS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, P OLICIES, AND PERSPECTIVES 84-89 (4th ed.
2010); MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POLICE 13539 (5th ed. 2010).
75. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. For an overview of whether Congress or the Katz Court is
ultimately responsibility for prohibiting warrantless wiretaps, see Kerr, The Fourth Amendment,
supra note 31, at 839-56. For an excellent overview of the competing theories regarding Katz,
see Sklansky, supra note 72, at 882-86.
76. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
77. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
78. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. Id. Justice Harlan seems to limit his predictions about future cases and his assertions
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Katz holding too closely to places—whether public phone booths, homes, or
open fields—eviscerates the case of any meaning.80
After Katz, the Court continued to employ trespass81 analysis in Fourth
Amendment considerations,82 particularly in cases that involved houses and
did not involve wiretaps.83 The Oliver Court does the same, though with an
effort toward incorporating the language, if not the spirit, of the Harlan test.
The Court swept over the first prong84 of the Harlan test, only offering a
recitation of the holding from the lower court, which found that the defendant
“had done all that could be expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of
the farm that was searched.”85 By devaluing the overwhelming demonstration
about private places to situations where the defendant would be in conversation. He asserts at
the start of his concurring opinion “that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a
home, and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy.” Id. But to read this assertion without the limitation when in conversation would mean
that a person’s activities, which are readily visible in a public phone booth, would also be
protected.
80. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72
MISS. L.J. 143, 158 (2002). Katz is a case about conversation, not about location. If the Katz
phone booth had been in an open field, surely the Court would have reached the same
conclusion because conversations by telephone, at the time, demonstrated a subjective
expectation of privacy between the speaker and the listener and society was prepared to endorse
that expectation of privacy.
81. I use the term trespass with two meanings, as does the Court. Trespass analysis in the
traditional Fourth Amendment context of Olmstead required courts to determine whether the
police had crossed over a protected threshold. Criminal trespass, the other meaning, was often
the driving doctrine in Fourth Amendment trespass analysis, as it was in Silverman. The Court
in Oliver found it unnecessary to engage in any complete pre-Katz model of analysis, and it
rejects the positive law of criminal trespass.
82. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
83. See Sklansky, supra note 72, at 885 (“The result has been that, outside the area of
electronic surveillance, the scope of the Fourth Amendment under Katz has looked a lot like the
scope of the Fourth Amendment under the old, ‘trespass’ test of Olmstead v. United States.”).
84. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). There are many critics of the
Court’s two-part test for assessing whether a defendant had a justifiable expectation of privacy,
and most focus on the inherent irrelevance of the first prong’s assessment of the defendant’s
subjective expectation of privacy. The second prong, what society is prepared to tolerate, is the
brainchild of legal pragmatism, calling on judges to “define fundamental constitutional values
by referring to contemporary social values, goals, and attitudes.” Cloud, supra note 33, at 250;
see also Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Model of the Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647,
681 (1988); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1, 43-44 (1991) (proposing ways to honor an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy).
85. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173. The Court does not engage with the overwhelming evidence
of the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy – including posted “No Trespassing” signs
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of a subjective expectation of privacy,86 the Court was left to engage in a
history lesson to declare that this kind of expectation of privacy is one that
society is never prepared to recognize.87 The Court returned to the open fields
doctrine as an expression that society is not willing to tolerate individual
demonstrations of a subjective expectation of privacy. In its refusal to honor
the demonstrated, subjective expectations of the landowners, the Court
rejected a case-by-case approach, and established a per se rule that warrantless
government intrusion into any open field does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.88 Specifically, the Oliver majority rejected the following rule
from Katz: “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”89
The Court’s post-Oliver Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, however, does
not reject this rule. It is the expansiveness of the Court’s ruling in Oliver that

at regular intervals, a locked gate, and the establishment of a field in a highly secluded area
“bounded on all sides by woods, fences, and embankments.” Id. at 174. Instead, the Court
addresses only whether society is prepared to acknowledge the subjective demonstration of
privacy. To see the two parts as unhinged from one another is to employ circular logic. See
Sklansky, supra note 72, at 886.
86. Of interest is Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in another open fields case decided
just after Oliver. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the Court held that warrantless
aerial observations by the police of curtilage spaces directly adjacent to the dwelling house did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. In Ciraolo, Justice Powell criticizes the majority for
significant departure from the Katz standard and argues that society has a per se expectation
of privacy in the curtilage. See id. at 221. Powell’s philosophy focuses, foremost, on the nature
of the space being searched rather than on the conduct of the government. In Ciraolo, the police
were not committing an act of criminal trespass in their aerial observation, whereas in Oliver,
they were.
87. Or put another way, a reasonable expectation of privacy is what the Court says it is.
See Cloud, supra note 33, at 200-01 (explaining that as the Court employs pragmatist theories
to search and seizure law, the end result may seem chaotic); Michael Abramowicz,
Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L.REV. 1, 60 (2001) (“When judicial decisions affect
people’s reasonable expectations of privacy and the reasonableness of a search depends on such
expectations, the judicial decisions are indirectly affecting the Constitution’s meaning.”).
88. By crafting a bright-line rule, the Oliver Court creates the opportunity for an absurd
result in the future. If Charlie Katz stepped into a phone booth that sat in an open field on
posted, private property and placed a call, the police could lawfully wiretap the phone, but if
he stepped into a phone booth on a crowded city street, they could not. Beyond absurd results,
Professor Raymond Ku crafts an interesting argument that in creating bright-line exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment, the Court neglects its constitutional duty as a check on an unrestrained
executive. See Raymond Ku, The Founder’s Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power
of Technological Surveillance after Kyllo, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1328 (2002).
89. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (internal citations omitted).
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remains most troubling, particularly in light of the Court’s subsequent
decisions regarding government intrusions into private spaces accessible from
public places.90 As plainly applied, Oliver and Thornton sought to preserve as
private an area that was not accessible to the public, short of criminal trespass.
The Oliver majority declared that some posted, private property deserves no
more protection from government intrusion than public property, and that an
open field deserves no protection, regardless of a person’s subjective
expectation of privacy. Consequently, the Court’s position in this case could
easily reach the result that a private conversation in a telephone booth on a
busy street corner deserves Fourth Amendment protection while a cell phone
conversation in one’s own posted, private field does not, merely because in the
former instance the speaker can demonstrate a justifiable expectation of
privacy by standing in a phone booth while in the latter, the speaker in the
field cannot.
The culmination of the two disjointed theories is the assertion of a per se
rule that no court in the future need ever “balance the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion”91
when the police have conducted a search from or in an open field.
Underpinning the open fields doctrine is the Court’s most fundamental
jurisprudence, that the Fourth Amendment shields people “from unreasonable
government intrusions into . . . legitimate expectations of privacy.”92 But, the
Oliver Court declared that a citizen cannot have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in open fields or other areas that “do not provide the setting for those
intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance.”93
90. It is as if the Court has a blind spot for reconciling its open fields doctrine with the rest
of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)
(holding that a warrantless aerial inspection of private property does not violate the Fourth
Amendment because any member of the public could conduct this inspection from a
commercial airplane flying overhead).
91. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
703 (1983)). I submit that a trial court should reach the balancing analysis recently reiterated
in Scott when it encounters a warrantless entry into any posted, private property; under the open
fields doctrine, a wholly unreasonable seizure in an open field is admissible. See Oliver, 466
U.S. at 181.
92. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565 (1991).
93. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. The facts in Oliver and Thornton did not require the Court
to contemplate whether a person in an open field would be entitled to any Fourth Amendment
protection, since the officers observed a static agricultural activity rather than dynamic human
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Justice Marshall’s dissent in Oliver seems acutely prescient of how
government agents might abuse an open fields doctrine, and he suggests the
slippery slope of jurisprudence that would result in the wake of the majority’s
opinion.94 He wrote, “By exempting from the coverage of the [Fourth]
Amendment large areas of private land, the Court opens the way to
investigative activities we would all find repugnant.”95 The absolute
exemption of huge tracts of personal property from the reach of the Fourth
Amendment ignores the prevailing inquiry into intrusiveness that the Court
makes with most other Fourth Amendment claims.96
II. Criminal Trespass, Historical Debates, Source Material, and the Fourth
Amendment
When the majority in Oliver cited to Katz—“[t]he premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discarded”97—it did so for the inverse of the purpose of the Katz rule. Katz
offered more protection to people from government intrusion by discarding the
limitations of the “old” trespass rule.98 The Oliver court seems to view Katz
as a wholesale rejection of all trespass analysis in favor of the justifiable
expectation of privacy doctrine.99 The Oliver Court reasoned that the law of
activities. But Justice Marshall’s dissent provokes the majority into opining on the issue in a
footnote. The Court writes that “the Fourth Amendment provides ample protection to activities
in the open fields that might implicate an individual's privacy.” Id. at 179 n.10. It goes on to
reference that citizens maintain some rights to privacy even in public places, leading one to
conclude that the Court views posted, private open fields in the same way that it views public
property. See id.
94. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 184.
95. See id. at 196 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his warning to the majority, Justice Marshall
suggests the danger of eroding Fourth Amendment protections through the open fields doctrine
by referencing United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring)
(“[W]hen police officers execute military maneuvers on residential property for three weeks of
round-the-clock surveillance, can that be called reasonable?”).
96. Here, I am relying on a study conducted by Christopher Slobogin of U.S. Supreme
Court Fourth Amendment cases which concluded that over 200 of the Court’s cases examine
intrusiveness or invasiveness. See Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public
Opinion: A reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1595 n.37 (2010).
97. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183.
98. Put another way, after Katz, the spike mic would still be an unlawful government
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
99. That the Court adopts the constrained view that property doctrine and the privacy
doctrine are mutually exclusive remains a mystery. Frankly, it does not require a complex,
post-modernist’s view to comprehend that the boundary between the property doctrine and the
privacy doctrine is “permeable and overlapping,” a reflection of the Court responding to new,
unanticipated situations involving invasive technology. See Kathryn Urbonya, A Fourth
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criminal trespass had no place in the open fields analysis for three reasons.
First, the Court found that, factually, fences and signs are not effective barriers
to bar the public from viewing open fields.100 Second, the Court found that the
purpose of trespass laws is fundamentally different from the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment.101 Finally, the Court found, without offering any support,
that the Framers did not intend for the Fourth Amendment to shelter criminal
activity.102
A. The Positive Law of Criminal Trespass
The Oliver Court’s bright-line rule103 that open fields are not protected by
the Fourth Amendment is hugely sweeping since the conduct of the spying
agents constituted criminal trespass.104 Also, considering the Court’s
definition of an open field as every place other than the home and the
curtilage,105 the Court effectively created a privilege for government agents to

Amendment “Search” in the Age of Technology: Postmodern Perspectives, 72 MISS. L.J. 447,
478 (2002).
100. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
101. Id. at 183 n.15.
102. Id. at 182 n.13.
103. With its bright-line open fields doctrine, the Court refuses to examine the police
certainty in the investigation – the police had none in Oliver – by exempting all open fields from
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. The Court generally views intrusions into private
spaces with an examination of the police certainty in their investigation. The Court allows more
intrusion when the police have probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed or that
a place contains evidence of a crime. The scale is sliding since Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), established an intermediate police-citizen interaction, one that necessitates that the
police have only a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. For a thorough
explanation of this “police certainty doctrine,” see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK:
THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 37-39 (2007).
104. Contrary to Justice Powell’s assertion, the Court did not reject trespass analysis after
Katz. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Since Katz we have
consistently held that the presence or absence of physical trespass by police is constitutionally
irrelevant to the question whether society is prepared to recognize an asserted interest as
reasonable” (internal citation omitted)). In fact, Powell’s assertion is incorrect, as he
acknowledged as the author of the majority opinion in United States v. U.S. District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ( The Court’s “decision in Katz refused to lock the Fourth Amendment to
instances of actual trespass”) (emphasis added). The Court did not abandon trespass analysis
in Katz; instead, it developed a more nuanced approach to the concept of trespass and moved
beyond the notion of actual, physical trespass. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 512.
105. The general test used by the Court to determine whether a space is curtilage or an open
field employs four factors: 1) proximity of the area to the home, 2) whether the area is enclosed
along with the home, 3) how the area is used by the resident, and 4) steps taken by the resident
to protect the area from observation. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
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trespass on vast swaths of land.106 The Court went to some lengths to justify
the privacy interest in, and Fourth Amendment protection of, the curtilage
adjacent to private homes, referring back to the Hester Court’s similar
assertion.107 In part, this was analytically necessary given the Court’s reliance
on the plain text of the Fourth Amendment; insofar as “curtilage” is not listed
there, the Court needed to establish that the curtilage was considered part of
the “house” at common law.108 Of course, the laws of criminal trespass apply
to houses, curtilage, and open fields without distinction.
Positive law,109 such as a criminal trespassing statute, is not the sole means
by which the Court can assess society’s expectations of privacy. The Court
consistently looks outside of the confines of the Fourth Amendment to
determine what society is willing to recognize as reasonable.110 The Court
describes these as “sources outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that
are recognized and permitted by society.”111 Perhaps the best example of the
Court’s reliance on trespass law comes from the seminal Fourth Amendment
case, Boyd v. United States.112 In Boyd, the Court addressed whether the
compulsory production of private papers prompted Fourth Amendment review,
106. It is hard to imagine a prosecutor offering evidence of marijuana farming from the
agents in Oliver, then turning around and prosecuting those agents for criminal trespass.
107. From Hester and Oliver, the Court adopts an approach that all private property that is
neither the house nor the curtilage is an open field. See id. at 300. “[T]he central component
of this inquiry is whether the area harbors the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of
a man’s home and privacies of life.’” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 6161 (1886)).
108. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 186 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“We are not told, however,
whether the curtilage is a ‘house’ or an ‘effect’ – or why, if the curtilage can be incorporated
into the list of things and spaces shielded by the Amendment, a field cannot.”).
109. See Orin Kerr, Four Models, supra note 36, at 516-19 (theorizing that an examination
of positive law offers a model for courts when determining the reach of Fourth Amendment
protection); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 191 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Thus, positive law not
only recognizes the legitimacy of Oliver’s and Thornton’s insistence that strangers keep off
their land, but subjects those who refuse to respect their wishes to the most severe
penalties—criminal liability.”).
110. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). As it did when citing Katz, the Oliver
majority cites Rakas v. Illinois for the limitation on the Rakas rule rather than for the rule itself.
See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 (“[E]ven a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the
premises or activity conducted thereon”).
111. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
112. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court specifically linked the Fourth Amendment to trespass
law in Boyd; quoting Lord Camden, the author of legal opinions celebrated by the English and
the American colonists, the Court reiterated that the “great end for which men entered into
society was to secure their property.” Id. at 627.
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and in deciding that the Fourth Amendment did protect personal papers, the
Court relied on property law.113 In basic, common law terms, a citizen could
expect privacy behind the castle gates, and trespass law helped enforce that
privacy interest against invaders; the Fourth Amendment offered the same
protection against government intruders, notwithstanding contemporary
interpretations that extend the castle gates to intangible privacy interests in the
spoken word captured by technology.114 As the Court expanded its
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to include privacy and personal
security, it did not reject the trespass doctrine;115 it merely found the trespass
interpretation too narrow for the intrusions of modern technology. But the
Oliver Court chose to interpret the evolution from the narrow trespass doctrine,
to the Katz notion that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, as
a near rejection of trespass principles by applying the limitation on the rule:
“even a property interest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a
legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items or activity
conducted thereon.”116
113. Id. at 623-624. Fourth Amendment scholars criticize the Court’s early, slavish use of
property law as the cornerstone of its Fourth Amendment analysis. See AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE CONSTITUTION AND C RIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 23 (1997) (employing the
term “property worship”); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era:
Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 579-80 (1996)
(arguing that the Boyd Court established a near absolute adherence to theory that property rights
trumped police powers, thus sanctifying property rights much as the Court had done in
Lochner).
114. See Kathryn Urbonya, supra note 98, at 477-83 (explaining that the Boyd Court’s
understanding that the citizen’s “sacred right” in his real and personal property also
encompassed his “personal security and personal liberty” (citations omitted)). It took the Court
two generations to move from its constrained view that the Fourth Amendment could not protect
words obtained without trespassing to its expansive view that citizens have a privacy interest
in all words in which they maintain a justifiable expectation of privacy. See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“We conclude that the
underpinnings of Olmstead [...] have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the
“trespass” doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling”).
115. To the contrary, courts continue to embrace trespass doctrine to interpret the Fourth
Amendment. See Luke Milligan, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Trespassers: Searching For
the Legitimacy of the Government-Notification Doctrine, 50 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1360 (explaining
the conflict in the Amezquita-Ruckman theory, which holds that trespassers have no legitimate
privacy interest even in tents or campers, and the Government-Notification Doctrine, which
requires the government to prove that the defendant was a trespasser and had been notified of
such before admitting evidence gathered during a warrantless search of a tent). That trespassers
may have more of an expectation of privacy than landowners against government intrusion
seems an absurd result.
116. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183.
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Orin Kerr has written that “[t]he positive law approach is descriptive, not
normative: it asks whether the government’s access to the suspect’s
information was achieved legally based on preexisting legal doctrine.”117 The
simple inquiry is whether the government broke an existing law in order to
obtain the information, and if it did, then the government has violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy.118 The Court has never made this approach,
of considering and applying positive law, mandatory in its Fourth Amendment
analysis, and the majority in Oliver considered and rejected the positive law
approach.119
The Court in Oliver was evidently satisfied that it was not required to follow
the law of trespass, to the extent which that law forbids intrusions onto posted,
private lands, in defining whether open fields deserved Fourth Amendment
protection.120 The Court concluded “that the government’s intrusion upon the
open fields is not one of those ‘unreasonable searches’ proscribed by the text
of the Fourth Amendment.”121 Because the Fourth Amendment extends only
to “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and not, as James Madison wished,
to “other property,”122 the Court reasoned that the distinction between the
protected house and the unprotected “other property” evolves properly as pure
textual construction.123 Though the common law plainly recognized trespass
117. Kerr, Four Models, supra note 36, at 516.
118. Id.
119. Had the majority accepted the positive law approach, it would have found that the
officers in Oliver were trespassing, and as they broke the law in obtaining the information about
the marijuana fields, they violated a reasonable expectation of privacy. See generally, KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 511.070 (West 1964); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17A, § 402 (1964). Under the first
prong of the Katz test, the defendants in Oliver did everything within reason to demonstrate
their subjective expectation of privacy, like erecting fences and posting signs. Under the second
prong of the Katz test, society would certainly be prepared to recognize an expectation of
privacy as justifiable if the government agents committed criminal trespass, resulting in a
Fourth Amendment violation in this open field search.
120. Specifically, at the time of the government intrusions onto Oliver’s and Thornton’s
posted, private property, the law in Kentucky criminalized “knowing entry upon fenced or
otherwise enclosed land, or upon unenclosed land conspicuously posted with signs excluding
the public,” and the law in Maine criminalized intrusion into “any place . . . which is posted in
a manner prescribed by law or in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders which is fenced or otherwise enclosed.” KY. REV. STAT. §§ 511.070(1), 511.080,
511.090(4); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 17A, § 402(1)(c).
121. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
122. A reading consistent with Madison’s original draft is wholly proper, and is, in fact,
consistent with the Ninth Amendment’s directive that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution
of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
123. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-77 (quoting NELSON B. LASSON,
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
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as an improper incursion onto land, the Court ignored the profound conflict
created by its expanded open fields doctrine and common law trespass
principles.124
It is the majority’s wholesale rejection of the positive law of trespass that
makes the overall reasoning in Oliver most suspect.125 “One of the purposes
of the law of real property (and specifically the law of criminal trespass) is to
define and enforce privacy interests—to empower some people to make
whatever use they wish of certain tracts of land without fear that other people
will intrude upon their activities.”126 Read in the extreme, after Oliver,
government agents are allowed to break down fences to enter private property
and ignore demands to leave private property without fear of prosecution.127
One is left to think that the Court created a privilege for government agents
who trespassed onto posted, private property.128
According to the Oliver majority’s reasoning, trespass laws reflect only the
normative attitude of society toward intrusions by private citizens.129 If
trespass laws have no meaning in the Court’s determination of whether a
citizen can have a reasonable expectation of privacy against government
CONSTITUTION 100 n.77 (1937)). Four states have disagreed with the expansive open fields
doctrine set out in Oliver. Vermont’s constitution offers more protection than the U.S.
Constitution. See VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 11 ("[T]he people have a right to hold themselves, their
houses, papers, and possessions, free from search or seizure."); State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d 988
(Vt. 1991) ("[A] lawful possessor may claim privacy in ‘open fields’ . . . where indicia would
lead a reasonable person to conclude that the area is private."). Mississippi, New York, and
Oregon have interpreted their constitutions, which have essentially the same language as the
U.S. Constitution, as offering more protection to their citizens than the Court authorized in
Oliver. See, e.g., Falkner v. State, 98 So. 691 (Miss. 1924); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328,
486 (N.Y. 1992) ("A constitutional rule which permits State agents to invade private lands for
no reason at all–without permission and in outright disregard of the owner’s efforts to maintain
privacy by fencing or posting signs–is one we cannot accept as adequately preserving
fundamental rights of New York citizens."); State v. Dixon, 766 P.2d 1015 (Or. 1988).
124. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
125. Or, put another way, “[t]he Oliver Court justified this curious doctrine by rejecting the
positive law model.” Kerr, Four Models, supra note 36 at 518.
126. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 190 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. See Stephen Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As
Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 19 (1986).
128. The Court often excuses the authorized criminality of police officers, especially those
working in drug enforcement. For a full treatment of the harms to the criminal justice system
from criminal conduct by police, see Elizabeth Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover
Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2009).
129. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183-84 (“Thus, in the case of open fields, the general rights of
property protected by the common law of trespass have little or no relevance to the applicability
of the Fourth Amendment.”).
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intrusion in an open field, then a property owner’s only option to protect
himself from the spying eye of the government would be self-help.130 A
private person cannot hike across posted, private property without fear of
criminal recourse; likewise, a hunter who follows a target onto private property
cannot do so without fear of criminal recourse. Nevertheless, according to the
Fourth Circuit, a government agent can enter posted, private property with a
camera and set up a constant spying operation of the owner’s activities without
even a nod in the direction of constitutional consideration.131 The property
owner has no recourse against the trespassing and has, thus, a severely
diminished interest in his real property.
B. Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
The Oliver majority purported to look to the Framers as it grappled to
justify that a landowner has no expectation of privacy, under any
circumstances, in a posted, private open field, and it declared that the Framers
had a very firm understanding of those areas—like the home—that should be
“free from arbitrary government interference.”132 But the majority leapt
quickly to an account of the “sanctity of the home” doctrine that supported its
conclusion that only the home – and not an open field – deserves protection
under the Fourth Amendment. That the Court looked to the use of open
fields133 rather than to the history of the sanctity of all property, both enclosed
and open, reveals a disingenuousness in its original intent analysis.134
130. See id. at 195 n.19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). While deadly force is justified only in
response to deadly force, land owners do have the right to use the force necessary to eject a
trespasser. A court might examine the force used by the trespasser to accomplish illegal entry
onto the land to determine the justifiable force that the landowner could use to eject.
131. United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2743 (2009) (holding that warrentless, long-term, trespassory videotaping on posted, private
property does not violate the Fourth Amendment protection of citizens to be free from
unreasonable searches).
132. Id. at 178.
133. Id. at 179.
134. I am not attempting to resolve whether the Framers intended that open fields deserved
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, and I am not entering the debate about the true
meaning and intent of the Fourth Amendment that can be gleaned from the plain text and
historical review. Professor Thomas K. Clancy is the leading Fourth Amendment historian, and
his work reflects a depth and nuance of the issues that the Oliver majority largely ignores. See
Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of
Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 483, 490-517 (1995) (discussing the long history
of the role of property rights and liberty in the development of the Fourth Amendment); Thomas
K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309-27 (1998) (offering an extensive overview of the Court’s
property-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and evidence of the historical roots of the
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The question of the Framers’ intent is both complex and highly contested,
something the Oliver majority failed to acknowledge. That the Court selected
a tiny snippet of the complex record of the Framers’ understanding of property
protection through the Fourth Amendment suggests an indifference to any
substantive analysis of how the Framers might have viewed the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment in light of the Court’s expansion in Katz. What follows
here is not a complete rendering of the history of the Fourth Amendment or the
history of the underlying property laws of England and the American colonies.
The Fourth Amendment, among other parts of the Constitution, was meant to
reflect the tension between state power and individual rights. The Oliver
majority’s failure to acknowledge that the Framers were intensely protective
of property rights should prompt skepticism.135
Originalist analysis of the Fourth Amendment begins with William
Blackstone, as he captured the laws of England in his Commentaries on the
Laws of England, which on many accounts formed the most significant basis
for the Framers’ understanding of the law.136 In presenting his Commentaries,
William Blackstone described the absolute right of property obtained from
Magna Carta, and applied it to a man’s lands, not just his home:
[Pursuant to Chapter 29] and by a variety of ancient statutes it is
enacted that no man’s lands or goods shall be seised into the king’s
hands, against the great charter, and the law of the land; and that no
man shall be disinherited, nor put out of his franchises or freehold,
unless he be duly brought to answer, and be forejudged by course
of law; and if any thing be done to the contrary, it shall be
redressed, and holden for none.137
Blackstone viewed property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total

notion that property rights are sacred).
135. I am making no effort to be comprehensive or exhaustive in this historical review;
however, I am being more complete than the Oliver majority.
136. This Article does not concern itself with constitutional hermeneutics, and acknowledges
the interpretive theory of the Constitution is highly contested. The scant Framing history
offered here serves only as a suggestion that the Oliver majority failed to give even the smallest
attention to the fact that the Framers may well have had a reasonable expectation of privacy for
activities in open fields. For a detailed look at the original meaning debates, see, for example,
Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 459
(2009); Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
427 (2007).
137. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135.
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exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”138 For
Blackstone, the right to exclude others from real property was enforceable by
the trespass laws and did not even require the presence of a tangible enclosure
delineating the private nature of the space:
[E]very man’s land is in the eye of the law enclosed and set apart
from his neighbor’s: and that either by a visible and material fence;
. . . or by an ideal inviolable boundary, existing only in the
contemplation of law . . . and every such entry or breach of a
man’s close carries necessarily along with it some damage or other.
. . . 139
In addition, Blackstone noted that, while the law did provide for exceptions
which would not result in a trespass action, a trespass ab initio would result
where an individual invaded property without proper authority, such as “[i]n
cases where a man misdemeans himself, or makes an ill use of the authority
with which the law entrusts him,” as “this wrongful act shall affect and have
relation back even to his first entry, and make the whole a trespass.”140 Despite
Blackstone’s thesis that a boundary need not be visibly marked, so long as it
was legally understood—“an ideal inviolable boundary, existing only in the
contemplation of the law”141—a 1769 case involving property rights provided
that, since “the principal end for which the first institution of property was
established” was “to preserve the peace of mankind,” then some mark should
be placed on property in order to distinguish it so that “every body knew that
it was not open to another” and “none should intrude upon the possession of
another.”142
The Framers relied heavily on the British example in outlining the right to
property.143 For example, John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, like the
work of Coke and Blackstone, would have been widely read by the Framers
and is often said to have been incorporated into their views of property.144
138. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
139. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209-10.
140. Id. at *212-13.
141. Id. at *209-10.
142. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 217-19, 235.
143. See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 121 (emphasizing that
Americans of the founding generation would have viewed security, liberty, and property as
absolute rights because Blackstone had indicated such). In fact, it is security that has garnered
the most attention from scholars, not property, as the meaning of the former is harder to
decipher than the latter. See id. at 123; see also, Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 668 (1999).
144. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 30 (2001).
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Locke famously believed that “[t]he great and chief end therefore, of Mens
uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is
the Preservation of their Property.”145 For Locke, then, property rights were
strongly tied to an individual’s fundamental right to liberty, and government
should be limited to preserving those rights, as government “has no other end
but the preservation of property.”146 His proposition was that society is formed
by people who “unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.”147
This broad and inviolate view of property as a natural right, intimately
intertwined with liberty and freedom from government intrusion, was
influential on the men who wrote and ratified the Constitution, and can be
traced in their writings, the various state constitutions adopted during the
revolutionary period, and the earliest drafts of the Fourth Amendment itself.
In 1776, John Adams declared:
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the
enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing
laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the
expense of this protection; and to give his personal service, or an
equivalent, when necessary. But no part of the property of any
individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public
uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of
the people. In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not
controllable by any other laws than those to which their
constitutional representative body have given their consent.148
Although seven different states had constitutional provisions which
governed search and seizure by the time the Constitutional Convention met in
1787,149 it was most likely Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights and Constitution, drafted by John Adams and adopted in 1780, that
later served as the model for the Fourth Amendment: “Every subject has a

145. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 350-51 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1991).
146. Id. at 329.
147. Id. at 250.
148. John Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776), in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND
ILLUSTRATIONS, BY HIS GRANDSON CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS 225-26 (Charles Francis Adams
ed., 1856).
149. Lasson, supra note 123, at 82.
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right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person,
his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.”150
The absence of a Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution led to considerable
objections from opponents, including Richard Henry Lee and other writers
concerned that the new government would strip away fundamental rights. Lee
was so concerned that he drafted his own version of a Bill of Rights, where he
included a search and seizure clause that provided “the Citizens shall not be
exposed to unreasonable searches, seizures of their papers, houses, persons, or
property.”151 Writing in his “Letters from a Federal Farmer,” Lee claimed:
There are other essential rights, which we have justly understood
to be the rights of freemen; as freedom from hasty and
unreasonable search warrants, warrants not founded on oath, and
not issued with due caution, for searching and seizing men’s
papers, property, and persons.152
Lee was hardly alone in moving for a Bill of Rights. The New York
Convention that ratified the Constitution proposed an amendment that would
have given every freeman “a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches
and seizures of his person, his papers, or his property.”153 The North Carolina
Convention proposed a similar provision protecting against “unreasonable
searches and seizures of his person, his papers and property,”154 and Virginia’s
1788 ratifying convention proposed a federal amendment to affirm that “every
freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures
of his person, his papers and his property.”155
James Madison’s first draft of the Fourth Amendment secured all of an
individual’s property from government intrusion: “The rights of the people to
be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property,
from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants
issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized.”156 The Federalist papers contain several instances in which Madison
150. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 238-39
(1988).
151. Id. at 241.
152. PAUL LEICESTER FORD, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION 315 (1888).
153. B. SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 913 (1980) (reproducing New York
proposed amendments, 1778) (cited in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 93 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
154. Id. at 968 (reproducing North Carolina proposed Declaration of Rights, 1778).
155. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 184 (1957).
156. NELSON B. LASSON, supra n.123, at 100 n.77 (citing Annals of Cong., 1st Cong., 1st
sess., p. 452).
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explained his belief that government exists to support and defend property
rights: “The protection of these faculties [the rights of property] is the first
object of government,”157 and “[g]overnment is instituted no less for protection
of the property, than of the persons, of individuals.”158 Madison’s consistent
interpretation of property as encompassing everything that a man acquires
(“whatever is his own”) can also be seen by this excerpt published after the
Bill of Rights was finally ratified by the states:
[A] man’s land, or merchandize, or money is called his property .
. . Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as
well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that
which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of
government, that alone is a just government, which impartially
secures to every man, whatever is his own.159
The proposed amendments of Lee, Madison, and the New York, Virginia,
and North Carolina ratifying conventions were consistent with this generallyheld view, and Madison’s writings before and after passage of the Bill of
Rights confirm his understanding of property rights. Although the final
version of the Fourth Amendment that was approved and ratified was different
from Madison’s original draft, in that it replaced the phrase “and their other
property” with “and their effects,”160 there is no historical documentation
explaining the purpose, if any, for such change. In defending the Constitution
against claims that it failed to protect property rights, John Adams asserted that
“[t]he moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred
as the law of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to
protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.”161 Madison similarly linked
personal security to property rights in his defense of the Constitution; “[h]ence
it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the
rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have
been violent in their deaths.”162 Moreover, in 1790, while the Bill of Rights

157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison).
159. James Madison, On Property, (March 29, 1792), in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION
598-99 (Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
161. JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1787), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 148 (George A. Peek,
Jr. ed. 2003).
162. Id.
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was being ratified, John Adams claimed, “[p]roperty must be secured or liberty
cannot exist.”163
Since the Fourth Amendment was drafted and ratified by men who saw the
invasive general warrants and writs of assistance as the ultimate intrusion on
their privacy and security, it is reasonable to assume that by buttressing the
security of their property rights, the Framers hoped that the Fourth
Amendment would fully protect those rights and shield the people from all
unreasonable searches and seizures by the federal government.164 In
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Court has time and again also focused
its attention on a closer examination of arguably the most critical of the
specific rights afforded property owners, namely, the right to exclude others,
and, in particular, the government.165
Though the Oliver majority declared that the plain text of the Fourth
Amendment limits the reach of Fourth Amendment protection, it could have
arrived at a more nuanced and complex conclusion,166 particularly in light of
the Court’s contemporary understanding that the Amendment protects people,
not places. The expansion of the plain text of the Fourth Amendment, to
include curtilage, offices, commercial buildings, and telephone booths,
provokes an acute conflict with the Court’s assertion that “the government’s
intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those ‘unreasonable searches’
proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment.”167

163. JOHN ADAMS, DISCOURSES ON DAVILA (1790), in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 280
(Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851).
164. WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING
767 (2009). See generally Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect:
Property, Privacy, or Security?, supra note 134 (concluding that the property- and privacybased analyses of the Fourth Amendment are flawed and that the Amendment instead should
be read as a protection of security interests).
165. See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) (“‘Property’ is more
than just the physical thing—the land, the bricks, the mortar—it is also the sum of all the rights
and powers incident to ownership of the physical thing. The right to use the physical thing to
the exclusion of others is the most essential and beneficial. Without this right all other elements
would be of little value.”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982) (“The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.”); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[A]n essential element of individual property
is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.”); White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J., concurring) (“The notion of property... consists in the
right to exclude others from interference with the more or less free doing with it as one wills.”).
166. In fact, the Ninth Amendment could be read to demand as much. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IX.
167. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
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The wholesale rejection of any legitimate expectation of privacy in an open
field is simply unsupported by even a quick history lesson, and the Oliver
majority’s assertion to the contrary relies on mere pronouncements about the
Framers’ intent. The Court relies on Justice Holmes’ formalist shorthand from
Hester in its troublesome, limited review of the legal history.168
III. The Dude Abides: How Temperance and Anti-Drug Movements
Justified the Creation and Expansion of the Open Fields Doctrine
By declaring that posted, private open fields deserved no constitutional
protection, the Oliver majority employed a policy model,169 importing its own
normative values into the decision, and situated its analysis outside of the
framework of most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Yet the Court curiously
rejected the need to establish any mechanism to determine the balance between
government justification and the invasiveness of the intrusion.170 In this
section, the Article will theorize how Prohibition-era policies and policing
necessities may have prompted the Court to establish the open fields doctrine
in Hester and how the war on drugs may have prodded the Court to reinforce
and extend the doctrine in Oliver. In Oliver, the majority adopted the tone of
Prohibition-era Fourth Amendment jurisprudence171 rather than that of the
Framing era or the contemporary era marked by the Katz test. In so doing, the
Court trapped its open fields doctrine in the 1980's pragmatism of dominant
drug enforcement policy; the blanket assertion of a per se open fields exclusion
from Fourth Amendment protection forecloses any future pragmatic approach
to other open fields issues.172
168. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (“The distinction between the [open
field] and the house is as old as the common law.”).
169. See Kerr, Four Models, supra note 36, at 519-22.
170. For a full explanation of the proportionality model for Fourth Amendment analysis, see
SLOBOGIN, supra note 103. “The principle component of this framework is the idea that the
justification for a government search or seizure ought to be roughly proportionate to the
invasiveness of the search or seizure.” Slobogin, supra note 96, at 1588.
171. The majority asserts that, “[c]ertainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth
Amendment should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent choose to
erect barriers and post ‘No Trespassing’ signs.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.13.
172. If the justification for the open fields doctrine in the 20th century relies on Prohibitionera policy and drug enforcement policy, then the doctrine should be applied in similar
situations. “What is noteworthy for this discussion is that the opinion ultimately rests upon a
pragmatist instrumentalism and concern for social and physical context that license judges to
base their decisions upon unsupported suppositions about the nature of social reality.” Cloud,
supra note 33, at 256-57. It is hard to see how the justification of protecting a migratory bird,
such as the red-tailed hawk, which can be trapped lawfully with a proper permit, can sustain the
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Current scholars tend to situate contemporary analysis of police
infringement on individual liberty in the police abuses of the Prohibition era
and in the restorative responses of the Modern era.173 The expansion of the
open fields doctrine was an exception to the pattern of restoring individual
rights in the Modern era after the police and courts trammeled them during the
Prohibition era.174 However, when the Court decided Oliver in 1984, a new
age of prohibition was underway that did not encourage a restoration of
property rights that could be framed as encouraging, or at least masking, illicit
behavior.
The U.S. war on drugs began in earnest during the Reagan era, and
politicians touted the drug scourge as something to fear, something that was
destroying the fabric of American culture.175 When faced with a marijuana
grower who tried to use private property laws to shield the very criminal
activity being warned of and being fought on foreign and domestic fronts, the
Court may have responded to the political pressure of the time and extended
the open fields doctrine decided in Hester—an alcohol prohibition case—to
Oliver—a marijuana prohibition case. A tacit effort to aid the raging war on
drugs may have motivated the Court to extend its open fields doctrine without
due regard for its evolving, flexible Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.176
However, as time has passed, the political climate that may have driven the
Court in deciding Oliver no longer exists. With more and more states
permitting the medical use of marijuana177 and with an Obama Justice
Department specifically instructed to avoid investigation and zealous

extension of the open fields doctrine to allow for constant video surveillance. See United States
v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2009).
173. See, e.g., Wesley Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 62 RUTGERS
L. REV. 447 (2010).
174. See Richard Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging
Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1100 n. 119 (1987) (detailing the many cases
where courts concluded that Katz simply overruled the open fields doctrine as set out in Hester).
175. See e.g., Lamar Jacob, Rolling Out the Big Guns, TIME, Sept. 22, 1986, http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,962371,00.html.
176. See Stephen Saltzburg, supra note 127, at 1.
177. The best resource for the current status of medical marijuana laws in the United States
is www.procon.org, which provides links to individual state statutes. Fifteen states – Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington—and the District of Columbia
currently have provisions for the legal use of medical marijuana. See http://medicalmarijuana.
procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881#summary.
Ten states—Alabama,
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
and North Carolina—have pending legislation to legalize medical marijuana.
See
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=002481.
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prosecution of marijuana-related crimes,178 it now appears that the open fields
doctrine lacks the justification of its political origin, just as many Prohibitionera doctrines did following a return to societal and governmental alcohol
tolerance. Moreover, by declaring that posted, private property was open to
government inspection without Fourth Amendment protection, the Court drove
marijuana cultivation indoors, where it has become significantly harder to
police.179 Finally, the rationale of effectively policing marijuana cultivation
fails to justify the expansion of the open fields doctrine to constant video
surveillance to police the largely regulatory crime of trapping a protected
migratory bird without a license.
A. How the Prohibition Era Established a New Standard for Police
Investigation
From 1920 to 1933, the Eighteenth Amendment180 prohibited the sale,
manufacture, and transportation of alcohol for consumption.181 While
numerous states had adopted state-wide bans on alcohol, the Eighteenth
Amendment broadened the scope of the prohibition to a federal one, without
any consideration for its enforcement.182 As is often the case with sumptuary
laws, the citizenry was not in step with Prohibition; alcohol was a piece of the
national fabric, and intense law enforcement efforts failed to curb alcohol
manufacturing and consumption.183
Because enforcement of Prohibition laws was difficult, and circumvention
was rampant due to a public perception that the laws were inane, police
178. See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General to All United
States Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009) (“As a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should not
focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”)
(on file with author).
179. The Court has been more likely to protect the illegal marijuana farming when it is
indoors. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
180. U.S. CONST. Amend. XVIII
181. The Eighteenth Amendment became effective on January 16, 1920, after 36 states
approved the Amendment.
182. The states had various methods for proscribing the use of alcohol. For a comprehensive
look at how the states handled prohibition of alcohol prior to the enactment of the Eighteenth
Amendment, see DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 83-95
(2010). Rhode Island and Connecticut rejected the Eighteenth Amendment and continued to
have state laws that regulated alcohol distribution throughout the Prohibition period. Id.
183. Insurance companies reported that alcoholism rates soared by more than 300 percent
during the 1920s, and by the close of the 1920’s, New York City had over 30,000 speakeasies.
See Deborah Blum, The Chemist’s War, SLATE, Feb. 19, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2245;
and see generally Boardwalk Empire (HBO 2010).
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resorted to invasive and deadly tactics to try to ferret out violators.184 There
were only 200 federal Prohibition officers in place in New York when the
Volstead Act took effect in January 1920.185 Most of those officers were
incompetent and corrupt, and during investigations, they destroyed private
property, accepted bribes, and opened their own illegal speakeasies.186 The
urban citizenry became intolerant of the unbridled incursion into privacy and
private spaces, and criminal defendants caught in the dragnet of Prohibition
began to challenge the admissibility of evidence seized in liquor raids under
the relatively newly-created exclusionary rule.187
The courts in urban centers like New York had little patience or tolerance
for the zealous enforcement of prohibition laws.188 The courtrooms were
flooded with new criminal defendants, each with a Fourth Amendment
challenge to the method of police search and seizure in their case.189 Yet
enforcement in urban centers was likely easier than enforcement in rural areas,
where landowners held vast acreage and could conceal the illegal
manufacturing and consumption of alcohol. Rural moonshiners developed
systems for customers to ring a bell hanging on a tree in the woods, take a
stroll, then return to find an alcoholic beverage waiting. Grateful customers
would then leave a fee at the tree.190 This entire enterprise would take place
on posted, private property, often highly guarded by people and dogs.191
184. Among the most egregious government effort to curb the consumption of alcohol was
the “chemist’s war of Prohibition,” a program run by federal agents to poison industrial alcohol
that was manufactured in the United States. See generally DEBORAH BLUM, THE POISONER’S
HANDBOOK: MURDER AND THE BIRTH OF FORENSIC MEDICINE IN JAZZ AGE NEW YORK (2010).
Bootleggers routinely stole industrial alcohol then re-natured and re-purposed it as drinkable
liquor. See Blum, supra note 183. During the Christmas season of 1926, 23 people died from
alcohol poisoning, compliments of the “chemist’s war,” and another 60 were made gravely ill.
Id. In 1927, deaths in New York City from alcohol poisoning reached 700. Id.
185. National Prohibition Act. ch.85, 41 Stat. 305 (Comp. Stat. Ann. 1923); see also
MICHAEL A. LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN: PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY 71 (2007).
186. See WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND
LONDON 78 (1973) (explaining expansive police corruption in the Prohibition era); LERNER,
supra note 185 at 70-71.
187. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (establishing the federal exclusionary
rule); Victor House, Search and Seizure Limits Under the Prohibition Act, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1923 at 14.
188. LERNER, supra note 185 at 80.
189. Id.
190. See David Stacks, Bluffton-Cherokee County’s Boomtown Gives Up Ghost, ANNISTON
STAR, Nov. 11, 1982, available at http://users.ap.net/~chenae/chertext.html (detailing a rural
history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century along the Alabama-Georgia border).
191. Some of the best descriptions of the rural moonshine industry during Prohibition (and
after, as moonshiners continued to manufacture and sell the alcohol free from government
taxation) can be found in folk music from the era. See AL HOPKINS AND HIS BUCKLEBUSTERS,
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Government agents simply could not patrol the area and enforce Prohibition
without entering posted, private property.
The Court offered support to police enforcement of Prohibition in its
interpretation of the reach of the Fourth Amendment. In Hester v. United
States,192 and Carroll v. United States,193 the Court concluded the warrantless
police searches of open fields and automobiles did not violate the Fourth
Amendment; in both cases, the Court grappled with how to interpret the Fourth
Amendment so that the police could tackle the difficult task of enforcement of
Prohibition. Of interest here is Hester, where Justice Holmes, writing for the
majority, put an end to any constitutional obstacle between law enforcement
officers and the application of Prohibition in rural communities. In facts
straight from Tobacco Road,194 Hester and his father operated a moonshine
business out of the family home. Customers drove to the house, and Hester
would exit the house to deliver quart bottles of moonshine whiskey.195 To
investigate this private moonshining operation, officers had to hide about 100
yards away from Hester’s house, on the Hester family property, to observe the
illegal transactions. When the officer gave a signal for the raid, one customer
threw his quart bottle, which the police recovered.196 Hester, who also had a
jug in his possession at the time the police emerged for the raid, threw the jug,
which broke, but “kept about a quart of its contents.”197 Hester challenged the
testimony of the officers at trial, claiming that they obtained the information
about the contents of the jug unlawfully, as they were trespassers on his private
property and had no warrant to enter it.198 The Court upheld the information
collection and the testimony. With very little fanfare, Justice Holmes
CAROLINA MOONSHINER (Brunswick, 1928); MEMPHIS MINNIE, MOONSHINE (Vocalion, 1936);
CHARLIE BOWMAN, MOONSHINER AND HIS MONEY (Columbia, 1929).
192. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
193. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, the Court held that automobiles carrying contraband,
like boats and wagons, were different from houses and stores in that “in it not practicable to
secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved.” Id. at 153.
194. ERSKINE CALDWELL, TOBACCO ROAD (1932).
195. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58 (recounting that during the raid, several other cars approached
the Hester house, but Hester’s father shooed them away). For whiskey purists, I have used the
conventional spelling of “whiskey,” to denote that its country of origin was the United States.
Justice Holmes used “whisky,” though I think he would likely agree that the moonshine had
been distilled in the United States.
196. To Justice Holmes, this was abandoned property, which is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Id. See generally United States v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
197. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58 (“The jug and the bottle both contained what the officers, being
experts, recognized as moonshine whisky, that is, whisky illicitly distilled; said to be easily
recognizable.”).
198. Id.
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authorized government spying on private property in the interest of
investigating the crime of illegal liquor distribution,199 an act that was no
longer criminal within a decade of the Court handing down its decision in
Hester.200
B. Illegal Activities in Open Fields: From Moonshining to Pot Farming
Just as government agents embraced the anti-alcohol fanaticism during the
Prohibition era, so too did government agents become vigilantes trying to
eradicate marijuana farming in the United States during the 1970s and
1980s.201 While marijuana now grows wild in the United States and was
farmed as hemp during the eighteenth century,202 marijuana first came to the
United States as an intoxicant commodity from farms in Mexico during the
early twentieth century.203 As Mexicans emigrated to the United States in
large numbers between 1915 and 1930, marijuana cultivation emigrated with
them, and where large Mexican communities grew, so too did marijuana crops
and use.204 States responded by passing legislation to outlaw the cultivation
and sale of marijuana, and in 1930, the federal government, by way of the new
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, began work on the Uniform State Narcotic Drug
Act.205 From a very early point in the effort to curb marijuana use, it was
recognized that prohibition of the cultivation of marijuana was necessary.206
Quashing marijuana cultivation and consumption was fairly easy for
government agents while the country held a national consensus about the evils

199. Id.
200. See U.S. C ONST. amend. XXI (“The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution is
hereby repealed”); OKRENT, supra note 182, at 353-54 (“On December 5, [1933], at 3:31 p.m.
local time, Utah became the thirty-sixth state to ratify the Repeal Amendment. At the age of
thirteen years, ten months, and nineteen days, national Prohibition was dead.”).
201. See RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: DRUG POLICY REFORM AND
P ROHIBITION POLITICS 20-60 (2004) (detailing the history of the war on drugs beginning with
the Nixon presidency).
202. Hemp was an agricultural crop at Mount Vernon, the home of George Washington, and
on the farms of Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin. See id. at 2.
203. See RICHARD B ONNIE & CHARLES WHITEBREAD, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A
HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (1999).
204. See id. at 38-39 (asserting that Colorado, in particular, reported widespread marijuana
cultivation and consumption, and the state became one of the first to pass legislation prohibiting
cultivation and sale in 1917).
205. See id. at 67. Harry Anslinger was the notorious first commissioner of the new bureau,
a post he held for 32 years. He undertook a massive media campaign to warn (white, naturalborn) citizens of the United States against the evils of narcotics and the usual group of narcotics
users (blacks and immigrants).
206. Id.
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of marijuana. But by the mid-1960s, the consensus began to disappear.207 The
shift from poor immigrant and black users to middle and upper-class white
college students offered a broader social awareness of the drug and enticed
researchers to look anew at the medical literature, much of which had been
concocted by prohibitionists.208 Yet the increased awareness of the drug and
the prolific use among college students did not quickly overwhelm the status
quo. In fact, the dominant anti-marijuana culture girded itself and increased
criminal penalties and investigation for marijuana use and cultivation.209
By
1970, college campuses reported marijuana use by well over 50 percent of
their student bodies, and substantial numbers of the young professional class
in urban centers reported marijuana use.210 Meanwhile, the law enforcement
community and prosecutors began to turn a blind eye toward casual use and
possession of an insignificant quantity of marijuana.211 Rather than punishing
the (sometimes young and affluent) users, state and federal law enforcement
began to focus their energy on the growers and the distributors of the drug.212
Unlike cocaine and heroin, marijuana was a home-grown commodity.
The consensus toward an acceptance of marijuana use that flourished in the
1960s did not persist through the 1980s, and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) declared marijuana use to be the United States’ most
serious drug problem.213 To combat the perceived problem, the DEA
developed a marijuana eradication program that consisted of search teams
looking for marijuana fields and burning them.214 The program was focused
207. Id. at 223.
208. Id.
209. In a speech at the University of Virginia, in 1970, Jerry Rubin, one of the Chicago
Seven, said, “Smoking pot makes you a criminal and a revolutionary—as soon as you take your
first puff, you are an enemy of society.” See JERRY RUBIN, DO IT! (1970).
210. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 203, at 237; see Behavior: Pop Drugs: The High
Way of Life, TIME, Sept. 26, 1969, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,844942,00.html; A.L. Mallabre Jr., Drugs on the Job, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
May 4, 1970.
211. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 203, at 239.
212. Id. at 241.
213. MITCH EARLYWINE, UNDERSTANDING MARIJUANA 225 (2002).
214. Id. Burning marijuana fields may seem like a drastic measure, but law enforcement’s
darkest hour came during a program aimed at eradicating Mexican marijuana fields. Much like
the poisoning of industrial alcohol during the Prohibition era, in the 1970s government agents
began spraying Mexican marijuana crops with paraquat, a toxic herbicide. See Deborah Blum,
supra note 183. Government officials believed that, if the public became aware that marijuana
crops were being sprayed with toxic herbicide, people would be deterred from using marijuana
since the toxic herbicide would sicken or kill the user. Id. In fact, marijuana users started
having their marijuana tested in labs for the presence of paraquat.
See Nation: Panic Over
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primarily in Hawaii and California, but it reached into forty states.215 People
such as Oliver and Thornton were the targets of this search and destroy
program.
In the Northern Hemisphere, marijuana grows best in direct sunlight during
the summer months.216 To avoid the observation of the public, marijuana
fields are often located in a clearing in an otherwise wooded area far from
public roads, and guerilla marijuana farmers often tend their plants in the
sunny clearings of wooded state or federal parks. The surreptitious growing
areas found in Oliver and Thornton were typical marijuana fields, far from the
public road, surrounded by woods, with numerous fences and No Trespassing
signs. Detection of these types of fields is very difficult for law enforcement
without entering the property to investigate.217 By employing an open fields
doctrine, police could wander freely (and constitutionally) on posted, private
property in the hopes of stumbling across illegal activity.218 Without an open
fields doctrine or a warrant, law enforcement would be stymied from detecting
most marijuana fields. Given the fervor in the 1980s to eradicate marijuana
growth and "win" the war on drugs, the Court may have viewed the open fields
doctrine as an essential tool for the DEA to make progress in its assaults on
growers.
C. Resolving (or Not) the Open Fields Doctrine with the Current
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s Reach
The Oliver majority’s normative values come across most plainly in an
unsupported footnote: “Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth
Amendment should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal

Paraquat, TIME, May 1, 1978, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,9195481,00.html.
215. EARLYWINE, supra note 213, at 225.
216. For an overview of contemporary marijuana farming operations in the California, see
David Samuels, Dr. Kush, THE N EW Y ORKER, July 28, 2008, http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2008/07/28/080728fa_fact_samuels.
217. Police do use helicopters with infrared cameras to detect the higher reflective nature
of marijuana plants. See id.
218. Ironically, the open fields doctrine served to make the investigation on marijuana
farming much harder because it drove farmers indoors. Indoor cultivation led to much more
stable and potent forms of marijuana as indoor farming became a true craft. See generally
MICHAEL POLLAN, THE BOTANY OF DESIRE 133 (2002) (offering a long history of marijuana
cultivation from a gardener’s perspective). Of course, indoor grow-ops can be guarded against
invasion by police and are much more difficult to detect and take down. Much like meth labs,
indoor marijuana farming has become a huge enterprise, highly profitable, and highly
specialized. See generally NICK REDDING, METHLAND: THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AN AMERICAN
SMALL TOWN (2009).
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intent choose to erect barriers and post ‘No Trespassing’ signs.”219 The Court
strived to determine whether Oliver and Thornton’s expectation of privacy was
legitimate, rather than reasonable.220 This test for legitimacy belies the
majority’s own normative values and forms the overall model for the majority
opinion.
While scholars debate whether empirical evidence of society’s toleration for
government intrusion is useful, all seem to agree that some examination of the
facts of each case is necessary.221 The net result of the majority opinion in
Oliver is that subsequent courts are not obliged to engage in the analysis of the
substantive facts—like how the defendant expressed his subjective expectation
of privacy and whether society is prepared to tolerate that subjective
expectation—once they determine that the property at issue is an open field,
and not curtilage. The Court engaged in a pure policy choice to leave all
government intrusion into posted, private open fields wholly unregulated,
resulting in an open fields doctrine untethered from precedent and tied only to
the socio-political context of 1984.
IV. Big Brother Is Watching: The Application of Oliver in the Wake of
Increasing Technological Advances
The federal circuits consistently apply the open fields doctrine, and the
factual circumstances are, likewise, regularly similar to Oliver. The two
factual features that most often compel application of the open fields doctrine
are 1) a one-time, brief intrusion for investigation of 2) a somewhat static,
agricultural condition.222 The Fifth Circuit has specifically held that open
fields analysis cannot ignore justifiable expectations of privacy analysis in all
cases.223
Justice Marshall’s warning in his Oliver dissent has seemingly come to life
in law enforcement’s contemporary interpretation of the open fields

219. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.13 (1984).
220. Id. at 182.
221. See Slobogin, supra note 96, at 1599-1607; Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth
Amendment, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951, 961, n. 14 (2009).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 551 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (cocaine cultivation);
Allinder v. Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1987) (beehives); United States v. Broadhurst, 805
F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986) (marijuana cultivation).
223. Husband v. Bryan, 946 F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1991). In Husband v. Bryan, the Fifth
Circuit recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in the land under an open field and
declared government agents must comply with the warrant requirement before removing dirt
in an open field. Id. at 29.
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doctrine.224 The first frightening extension came in Dunn v. United States,225
where the Court held that officers standing in an open field could lawfully peer
into a closed, private barn. The Dunn Court conflated its public space
jurisprudence226 with its open fields jurisprudence, without regard to the fact
that the officers who peered into Dunn’s barn were committing criminal
trespass.227 The strongest recent evidence of the diminution of a property
owner’s right to privacy is evidenced in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Vankesteren.228
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Recent Extension of Oliver
In Vankesteren, a game warden installed a hidden surveillance camera on
a farmer’s posted, private property to determine whether, based on an
anonymous tip, the farmer was trapping protected hawks.229 The game
warden, however, first trespassed on the land to search for evidence of traps.
Finding only lawfully trapped pigeons, he installed a hidden camera. The
game warden's intrusion, therefore, did not stop at one instance of
trespassing.230 Yet in reaching to uphold the game warden's continuous
intrusion into the farmer's privacy, the Fourth Circuit employed significant
extensions to the Court’s open fields doctrine.231 Unlike the agent in Oliver,
224. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 197 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“By exempting from coverage
of the Amendment large areas of private land, the Court opens the way to investigate activities
we would all find repugnant.”).
225. 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987)
226. The Court has defined public spaces in light of the Katz model. See Santana v. United
States, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (“While it may be true that under the common law of property the
threshold of one’s dwelling is ‘private,’ as is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless
clear under the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment Santana was in a ‘public’ place. She
was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy.”).
227. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304. (“Under Oliver and Hester, there is no constitutional
difference between police observations conducted while in a public place and while standing
in an open field.”)
228. 553 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2743 (2009).
229. See supra note 2.
230. In addition to the continuing trespass of the camera, the game warden counted nine
instances of actual trespassing onto Vankesteren’s property during the investigation. See
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 2 at 37a-40a.
231. The common argument justifying the use of invasive technology that increases the
feeling of intrusiveness of searches is that it allows the police to accomplish investigation more
efficiently than traditional, in-person surveillance. See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not like
1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 97 J. C RIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 542 (2007) (arguing that merely turning
a formerly labor intensive act of surveillance, like following a vehicle, into a more feasible task
with the use of technology is not unduly invasive). What Simmons and the Vankesteren Court
overlook, however, is that a suspect could see a person following him for 24 hours or could see
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the game warden found no evidence of any crime when he first investigated
the farmer’s open field.232 To the contrary, his warrantless inspection
produced only evidence of lawful trapping. Thus, the warden turned to video
technology to perpetually monitor the farmer’s field in the hopes of
substantiating an anonymous tip and capturing images of the farmer engaged
in illegal conduct.233
Despite significant factual differences between the Vankesteren case and
Oliver, the Fourth Circuit applied Oliver and the open fields doctrine in an
absolute manner. This extension of the doctrine contravenes the scant
protections that the Oliver Court might have envisioned in future cases: “The
correct inquiry is whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. As we have
explained, we find no basis for concluding that a police inspection of open
fields accomplishes such an infringement.”234 The Court’s language suggests
that any infringement beyond a police inspection, like the brief inspections in
Oliver and Thornton, requires extended Fourth Amendment consideration.235
However, the Fourth Circuit’s Vankesteren decision, like Justice Powell’s
majority in Oliver, failed to reflect either the wealth of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence or its historical underpinnings in theories of property rights and
the subsequent jurisprudence honoring an individual’s efforts to prevent
intrusion upon his land.236
Superficially consistent with the holding in Oliver, the Court in Vankesteren
stated that a farmer does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from a
game warden’s warrantless wandering onto his posted, private property on an
anonymous tip that the farmer was trapping protected birds.237 The Fourth
Circuit drastically extended Oliver, however, by allowing the continuous
surveillance of dynamic activity.238 The minor, fleeting, criminal trespass of
a game warden sitting on his property near his bird traps for weeks on end, and could alter his
conduct accordingly. Technologically enhanced surveillance does not merely substitute for inperson surveillance; rather, it enhances the likelihood of the police to capture relevant conduct
by making their presence invisible.
232. See id.
233. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 2, at 38a.
234. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984) (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 174 (noting that, in Thornton, the officer obtained a warrant before he returned
to the field to investigate further).
236. See id. at 187-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237. United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 287 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 2743 (2009).
238. See id. The Court gave little attention to the use of technology by the game warden and
ignored the general tests employed in technology cases in favor of expanding the open fields
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the officers in Oliver and Thornton, as well as instances of trespass found in
other circuits’ subsequent cases, involved static conditions and short
intrusions. Vankesteren allows for repetitive, long-term, and enduring
trespassing by a hidden video camera.239
The Fourth Circuit also devoted some effort to determine whether
Vankesteren’s field might be considered curtilage under the four-factor test
established in United States v. Dunn.240 The general test used by the Court to
determine whether a space is curtilage or an open field employs four factors:
1) proximity of the area to the home, 2) whether the area is enclosed along
with the home, 3) how the area is used by the resident, and 4) steps taken by
the resident to protect the area from observation.241 The Court reasoned that
Vankesteren’s field was outside of the allowable curtilage area because it was
located a mile or more from his home and was used primarily for farming
activities.242 The game warden installed the video camera on a posted, private
open field, and the Fourth Circuit equated the open field to public lands to
conclude that the installation of the video camera and subsequent video
recordings did not violate the Fourth Amendment.243
Had the game warden instead pointed his camera toward Vankesteren’s
house, the Fourth Circuit’s rationale would hold that the recording did not
violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the court could have determined that
Vankesteren’s home was readily visible from his open field.244 Because the
Fourth Circuit treated the installation of the camera in an open field as
identical to installation of a camera in public, it follows that the court would
have viewed any observation of unprotected curtilage by the hidden video
doctrine. Christopher Slobogin has developed a list of seven factors that courts often examine
when reviewing Fourth Amendment cases involving the use of technology. They are: 1) the
nature of the place being observed; 2) availability of the technology to the average consumer;
3) steps taken by the defendant to enhance his privacy; 4) degree of trespass on the private
property; 5) nature of the activity observed; 6) the extent to which the technology enhances
natural senses; and 7) whether the police took any steps to minimize the intrusion. See
Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The America Bar
Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 389-98 (1997).
239. For an excellent overview of how sustained surveillance should prompt a different
approach to the Fourth Amendment, see Afsheen John Radsan, The Case for Stewart over
Harlan on 24/7 Physical Surveillance, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1498-99 (2010) (asserting that the
invasion of a citizen’s privacy comes from the fact of the constant, invasive monitoring rather
than from its form).
240. 480 U.S. at 301.
241. See id.
242. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d at 290.
243. Id. at 290-91.
244. The recording also would not have violated the Fourth Amendment provided his home
was visible from space. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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camera as permissible. This presents a profound and troubling extension of
lawful, constitutional intrusion into private property by government agents.245
Law enforcement officers may fly overhead and lawfully photograph
subjectively private activities and conditions without raising Fourth
Amendment concerns because a one-time overhead flight, like a glance over
a backyard fence, is an intrusion that society is willing to tolerate.246 But in
Cuevas-Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit stated that installing a video camera on a
public utility pole pointed to monitor a person’s backyard activities "provokes
an immediate negative visceral reaction."247 The lawful glance over the fence,
like the trespassing game warden’s glance as he ambles through a posted,
private open field, does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of
protection from unreasonable searches.
Had Cuevas-Sanchez not
demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy by enclosing his curtilage
with a fence, the court would have engaged in significantly less analysis
regarding the probing eye of the video camera since the camera was installed
on a public utility pole.248 Because he did enclose his backyard, he had an
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Following the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, however, any video camera
posted in an open field is the same as a video camera posted on a public utility
pole. This is true even though the homeowner on a busy street might,
reasonably, fence his curtilage for privacy, while a farmer who owns
thousands of acres of open field might not fence his yard from the probing eye
of the unexpected, criminal trespasser. According to the Oliver majority,
society has been willing to tolerate fleeting intrusions for the purpose of
effective law enforcement, but the Vankesteren standard goes beyond what is
tolerable by society and by the historical standards of property rights that
grounded the Fourth Amendment.249

245. The Fourth Circuit declines to engage in any depth with the wealth of “doctrinal
difficulties for courts in applying the Fourth Amendment” in surveillance cases. See Russell
Weaver, The Fourth Amendment, Privacy and Advancing Technology, 80 MISS. L.J. 1131, 1134
(2011) (detailing the struggles of the Court to address ever-evolving technological advances in
the Fourth Amendment context).
246. United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 251 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Editorial, Ruling on Camera Badly Out of Focus, VIRGINIA-PILOT, Feb. 21,
2009, available at http://hamptonroads.com/2009/02/ruling-camera-badly-out-focus.
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B. The Role of Technology in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Unaided visual observation of the outside of a home does not constitute a
Fourth Amendment search.250 The use of technology, however, should change
the analysis by which the Fourth Amendment applies to otherwise
constitutional surveillance. The Fourth Amendment arguably requires that
constant video surveillance be held to a higher level of scrutiny under the open
fields doctrine. This is suggested by a number of federal and state courts
which have recognized that video cameras are more invasive than the unaided
eye.251
In Vankesteren, the Fourth Circuit asserted that "the placement of a video
camera in an open field does not portend the arrival of the Orwellian state" that
it might if the game warden had taken thermal images of the farmer’s home.252
To the contrary, the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo v. United States
suggests that the use of technology in general, and not just specific types of
technology like the thermal imaging scans at issue in Kyllo, to enhance
surveillance can affect the Fourth Amendment analysis of a potential search.253
In Kyllo, the Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the
government's use of a thermal-imaging device during a search. It held that the
government had performed a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when an agent of the United States Department of the Interior
used a thermal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat within a
private home.254 The thermal imaging device did not literally allow the agent
to see inside the house, but it allowed the agent to obtain information about the
250. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-35 (1986).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that “silent
video surveillance . . . results in a very serious, some say Orwellian, invasion of privacy”);
United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that “[p]ersons may create
temporary zones of privacy within which they may not reasonably be videotaped . . . even when
that zone is a place they do not own or normally control”); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez,
821 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1987) (video “surveillance provokes an immediate negative visceral
reaction: indiscriminate video surveillance raises the spectre of the Orwellian state”); United
States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that video cameras “could be grossly
abused—to eliminate personal privacy as understood in modern Western nations”); State v.
Thomas, 642 N.E.2d 240, 246-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that “[v]ideo surveillance is
highly intrusive and amenable to abuse, and a warrantless video search poses a serious threat
to privacy”); State v. Bonnell, 856 P.2d 1265, 1277 (Haw. 1993) (stating that “[w]e agree with
the . . . Fifth Circuit that [video] ‘surveillance provokes an immediate negative visceral reaction:
indiscriminate video surveillance raises the spectre of the Orwellian state’”).
252. United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 291 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 2743 (2009) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)).
253. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
254. Id. at 29.
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inside of the home by measuring the radiation of heat emitted from the outside
of the house which was otherwise unavailable to him through personal
observation—“naked-eye surveillance of a home.”255
The use of the thermal imaging technology, like the use of a hidden video
camera, will turn a commonplace observation of a home into a search because
it allows the government to obtain information surreptitiously.256 Although
Kyllo narrowly addresses the search of a home, the intense scrutiny given to
the government’s use of technology suggests that the Court is wary of
whittling away constitutional protections in the face of increased technological
capabilities.257 Unlike the minority in Kyllo, which would have found no
search as the surveillance only involved observations of the exterior of the
home,258 the majority found that the use of technology changed the character
of the surveillance in a way that was constitutionally significant. In a technical
sense, the government agents only searched heat emanating from the outside
of a house; such openly-perceivable heat receives no constitutional protection.
The use of technology to observe that heat, however, changed the nature of the
surveillance into a constitutionally impermissible search.259
The use of a permanent, hidden video camera should constitute a
constitutionally significant change to the character of what would otherwise
be a constitutional foray onto a private citizen's open field. For example, a
video camera allows the government to continuously collect information about
an individual without the need for a law enforcement officer to actually remain
on the property. The Fourth Circuit found this point to be insignificant in
Vankesteren, noting that the government could have stationed agents on the
property "twenty-four hours a day" and that the use of a "more resourceefficient surveillance method" was of no importance.260 This reasoning
ignores, however, the fact that the government would have been unlikely, or
even unable, to station an agent on the property twenty-four hours a day.
Limitations on resources—and the risk of detection—provide a check on the

255. Id. at 33-35 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
256. Id. at 34.
257. In Kyllo, however, the Court refined its holding from Dow Chemical because the
government in Kyllo had used technologically-enhanced surveillance. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
27. Similarly, the Supreme Court has not determined whether the use of a technological
enhancement should affect the Fourth Amendment analysis regarding the reasonableness of a
government intrusion into an open field.
258. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259. Id.
260. United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 291 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 2743 (2009).
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ability of the government to engage in this type of constant surveillance.261 As
in Kyllo, the government in the Fourth Circuit case used a technological
enhancement to do something that it would not have been able to do otherwise,
and, as in Kyllo, this technological enhancement allowed the government to
collect constitutionally protected information and to infringe upon the privacy
of an individual. Accordingly, the technological enhancement should have
affected the Fourth Circuit’s Fourth Amendment analysis.262
The Ninth Circuit has observed that “[e]very court considering the issue has
noted [that] video surveillance can result in extraordinarily serious intrusions
into personal privacy. . . . If such intrusions are ever permissible, they must be
justified by an extraordinary showing of need.”263 “Hidden video surveillance
is one of the most intrusive investigative mechanisms available to law
enforcement.
The sweeping, indiscriminate manner in which video
surveillance can intrude upon us, regardless of where we are, dictates that its
use be approved only in limited circumstances.”264 According to Oliver, a
citizen is bound to expect that he may be observed on his posted, private open
fields, but he should still be able to maintain a reasonable expectation that he
would not be subjected to such a severe intrusion into his privacy as the
probing, constant eye of the hidden video camera.265
Yet in Vankesteren, the Fourth Circuit relied on dicta in United States v.
Taketa266 to establish that “[v]ideo surveillance does not in itself violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Videotaping of suspects in public places,
such as banks, does not violate the Fourth Amendment; the police may record
what they normally may view with the naked eye.”267 However, Taketa
concluded that the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his office had
been violated by the hidden video camera even though the suspect was a DEA
agent and his office was one that could have been entered and observed by
261. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that
“[t]echnological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance that in
earlier times would have been prohibitively expensive”).
262. The Supreme Court has elsewhere noted that the use of invasive surveillance techniques
may change the Fourth Amendment character of otherwise constitutionally permissible actions.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (noting that "dragnet-law enforcement
practices" could require "different constitutional principles").
263. United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 551 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
264. United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
265. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (noting that some invasive inspections
are simply more invasive than others).
266. 923 F.2d 665, (9th Cir. 1991).
267. United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 2743 (2009).
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snooping law enforcement agents.268 Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on
Taketa appears to be misplaced.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that images captured by a government
agent’s installation of a hidden video camera placed on public, national forest
lands, which are open to the public, do not violate the Fourth Amendment.269
In McIver, a camera was installed and hidden on public lands, and the McIver
court praised the government agent’s "prudent and efficient use of modern
technology" by installing the video camera on public land and video recording
public activities.270 The McIver court, however, noted that its holding was
"quite narrow," with the decision hinging on the fact the government agent
installed the hidden video camera on public lands.271 Similarly, video cameras
mounted in public places, recording activities open to public observation, are
lawful and do not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if the video camera
records continuously.272
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has stated that once the police officer leaves an
area and can no longer observe the activities from a public space, he may not
video record the private activities.273 Although the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged in Vankesteren that the camera was doing more, albeit "little
more than the agents themselves could have physically done," it wholly
disregarded the need to engage in additional analysis when the camera does
more than the agents themselves could have done.274
Vankesteren marks what could be a potentially grave incursion against
individual rights. As law enforcement and espionage technology increases at
warp speed, the open fields doctrine will logically apply to increasingly more
areas. Satellites can view individuals sitting on their front porches, every
mobile device contains GPS capabilities, and remote searches of personal
computers is possible through a mere web connection. According to the
current open fields jurisprudence, Big Brother could be watching, and would
be doing so legally.

268. Taketa, 923 F.2d at 665.
269. United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1999).
270. Id. at 1125.
271. Id. at 1125-26.
272. See, e.g., State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318 (Utah App. 1998).
273. See, e.g., United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2000).
274. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d at 291; see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
Nerber, 222 F.3d at 604 (“the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy that they
would be free from hidden video surveillance while the informants were in the room” (emphasis
added)).
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V. Conclusion: A Balancing Act Between Necessary Police Intrusion and
Citizens’ Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Open Fields
The Fourth Amendment “was designed, not to prescribe with ‘precision’
permissible and impermissible activities, but to identify a fundamental human
liberty that should be shielded forever from government intrusion.”275 The
inflexible open fields rule in Oliver is largely a product of stare decisis, resting
on a one-line proclamation with little examination of the basis for the original
“rule.”276 The Oliver majority does review the issues under the Katz model,
but its reconsideration must be disingenuous since it proclaims a per se rule.
The Katz test simply does not allow for a per se result given the nature of the
two-part assessment.277 Justice Harlan’s two-part inquiry cannot have a readymade answer if applied properly, and if the Oliver majority truly believed that
the open fields doctrine was an ancient, per se rule, it would not have needed
to address the Katz model at all.278 Instead, the Court would have declared the
open fields doctrine as establishing areas beyond the protective reach of the
Fourth Amendment. That the Court did not make such a clear declaration
demonstrates that the open fields doctrine is not a permanent, ancient rule.
The Oliver Court’s engagement with the Katz model is flawed in three
ways. First, the Court ignores the subjective expectation of privacy portion of
the test by disregarding the substantial steps that the defendants took to
demonstrate their subjective expectation of privacy.279 Next, the Court
categorically declares that society is not willing to tolerate an expectation of
privacy for criminal activity,280 which, followed to its logical conclusion,
275. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 186 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
276. See id. at 176; Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
277. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring) (“My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a two-fold
requirement, first that the person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
278. For example, in consent cases the Court need only evaluate whether the defendant’s
consent was a product of free will not overborne by the police. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (viewing consent as an exception to the warrant requirement).
Because consent is an exception to the warrant requirement, the Court does not examine the
Katz justifiable expectation of privacy issues when it finds that the defendant consented to the
search.
279. One is left to conclude that no matter how high the fence, how guarded the boundary,
and how explicit the prohibition against trespassing, the Oliver court would have found the
subjective expectation of privacy unreasonable. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. That members
of the public may view the property from the air is a flawed analogy, since those viewing from
the air are acting lawfully and those wandering through a posted, private field are engaged in
criminal trespass. See id. at n.9.
280. See id. at 182-83 (holding that trespassing police officers inspecting marijuana fields
do not infringe upon societal values). Recall the Court’s formalist declaration in footnote 13:
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eviscerates the Fourth Amendment.281 Finally, the Court views the intrusion
by the police within the narrow socio-political context of the time without
much thought toward the ways the government might abuse an expansive open
fields doctrine in the future.282
Policy will and should play some role in the Court’s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, but a doctrine relying only on policy cannot withstand the
test of time.283 The open fields doctrine clearly sits well outside of the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since Katz, yet it claims the formalist
imprimatur of providing a clear “rule.”284 The combination establishes a
dangerous precedent; the inflexible approach in Oliver becomes impossible to
apply in any useful way to assess the reasonableness of police activity
involving the use of highly intrusive technology. Stare decisis allows lower
courts to apply the open fields doctrine like a blanket to all situations.285
What this Article offers is a doctrine, consistent with precedent, for use in
open fields cases. Since the possibility of a property owner having an
expectation of privacy can exist in an open field, courts should engage the
facts to determine whether that expectation is reasonable and legitimate. The
Court in Oliver looked only to its own normative values in employing the
policy model, and open fields, like telephone booths and commercial
businesses, deserve more (or at least some) scrutiny about what society is
willing to tolerate. The factual examination of what the government agent did
and how the citizen acted cannot be disregarded in construing the meaning of
an Amendment that purports to balance the interests of the state against those

“Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amendment should shelter criminal
activity wherever persons with criminal intent choose to erect barriers and post ‘No
Trespassing’ signs.” Id. at n.13 (emphasis added).
281. Of course, the police did not know of the criminal activity in Oliver until after they had
trespassed and, arguably, violated the Fourth Amendment. The implications of the Oliver
majority’s logic are more troublesome in other contexts. For example, the police can also
presume that black people running in high-crime neighborhoods are criminals. Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000); see also, Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment,
TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 254 (2010). Butler maintains that the Fourth Amendment has been a
“project” by the Court in the past 40 years “to expand the power of the police against people
of color.” Id. at 246.
282. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 197 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
283. See Kerr, Four Models, supra note 36, at 519 (“[T]he policy model, presumably, plays
a guiding hand in many cases even when an opinion itself is framed in terms the probabilistic
model, private facts model, and/or positive law model.”).
284. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176; Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).
285. See United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 288 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2743 (2009).
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of the individual.286 Katz clarified that how individuals act toward potential
government intrusion matters, and how society views intrusion more generally
is a necessary component to any Fourth Amendment analysis.287 No court
should disregard the holding in Katz in favor of its own policy model,
especially when the motivating force behind the policy, like drug or alcohol
prohibition, is subject to the dynamic opinions of an evolving society.
Society’s view on intrusiveness can change, a fact acknowledged by the
Court in Katz.288 Empirical studies could provide a reliable model for the
Court to measure society’s views, and they might be especially reliable in
cases involving an intrusion into posted, private property since the situation is
fairly static.289 For investigations of minor crimes, society may be less tolerant
of intrusion—especially when those investigations are based on
unsubstantiated tips. In an era when marijuana use is more tolerated and
prosecution is less vigorous than when the open fields doctrine hardened into
its contemporary form, society may view marijuana crimes as less serious, and
thus be less tolerant of government intrusion into posted, private property for
the purpose of general searches for marijuana.290 Or, even if society has an
abiding interest in the investigation and eradication of marijuana farming, it
may not have the same interest in prosecution of a regulatory environmental
crime, like trapping a red-tailed hawk without a permit.291
As was the case during Prohibition, and again during the intense days of the
war on drugs, law enforcement will always have a pressing reason to seek to
operate outside of the confines of the Fourth Amendment.292 But if Justice
Powell’s assessment is correct, that people engaged in criminal activity—like
growing marijuana—cannot expect to be protected by the Fourth Amendment,
then the Amendment has no meaning. The Court has struggled mightily with
286. Or, put in Professor Kerr’s terms, if a court employed the positive law and probabilistic
methods of analysis in Oliver, the result would be a likely finding that the defendants had taken
significant steps to maintain their privacy and did not expect their privacy to be invaded in light
of the criminal law remedies against trespassers. See Kerr, Four Models, supra note 36, at 50812, 516-19.
287. See id.
288. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“To read the Constitution more
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.”).
289. See generally, SLOBOGIN, supra note 103.
290. Id. at 1598. I would suggest that society, especially a rural society, would find the
killing of red-tailed hawks without a permit by a conservation gamekeeper to be a less-thanserious crime that would not justify a high degree of intrusion. Another comparable, and
perhaps more readily accessible example, would be the investigation of catch-and-release trout
fishing without a license on posted, private property.
291. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2004); 50 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2008).
292. The war on terrorism is the obvious new frontier.
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defining the Fourth Amendment since the wide adoption of the exclusionary
rule in 1963.293 Had the court truly employed the Katz test in Oliver, the
evidence would have overwhelmingly demonstrated the defendant’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, and under Mapp, the only remedy would
have been exclusion.294 While the Court has maintained the posture that it
concerns itself with how evidence is obtained rather than examining whether
the evidence would be helpful to the prosecution’s case,295 it has begun to relax
its stance on wholesale exclusion for illegally obtained evidence.296
In Hudson v. Michigan297 and Herring v. United States,298 the Court began
its march toward dismantling the exclusionary rule in favor of a balancing test,
which weighs the substantial deterrent effect of exclusion against the overall
harm to the justice system of admitting the tainted evidence.299 While I am no
advocate for abolishing the exclusionary rule, I can see how the open fields
doctrine might be a part of the constitutionalized common law, just as the
knock and announce rule was in Hudson.300 And a modified exclusionary rule
could still be simply applied in open fields cases while preserving the integrity
of Katz. The Court would first examine the facts to see whether the defendant
had demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in how he maintains and
guards against intruders into his open field. Evidence of “No Trespassing”
signs and fencing, in addition to the remoteness of the field in question and
what obstacles the police encountered while getting to the field, would inform
the Court of the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and whether
293. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (expanding the federal exclusionary rule
established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
294. The Mapp majority plainly held that exclusion was the proper remedy for evidence
obtained in violation on the Fourth Amendment, even if “the criminal goes free.” Id. at 659.
295. For more on deontological ethics, see Arthur LeFrancios, On Exorcising the
Exclusionary Demons: An Essay on Rhetoric, Principle, and the Exclusionary Rule, 53 UNIV.
CIN. L. REV. 49 (1984).
296. Justice White served as the Court’s leading proponent to abandon the exclusionary rule.
He joined the Court one year after Mapp was decided, and he spent the next thirty years filing
dissenting opinions in Fourth Amendment cases where he argued for the abolition of the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). White succeeded only once
is restricting the reach of the exclusionary rule, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
For more, see generally DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO WAS ONCE WHIZZER WHITE
401-02 (1998) (detailing Justice White’s “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule).
297. 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (allowing for the admission of evidence after officers violated a
court-created knock and announce rule).
298. 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a police
recordkeeping error).
299. Id.
300. 547 U.S. at 604.
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society would tolerate that expectation.301 But with a refined analysis of the
evidentiary question of exclusion, the Court need not exclude the evidence
even if it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Katz.
If the police obtained evidence of marijuana cultivation in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, but the Court concluded that suppressing the evidence
would be detrimental to the overall justice system, then the court could admit
the evidence even if the police might be deterred in the future from such
unconstitutional incursions. The crime of trapping a red-tailed hawk without
a permit, in the current political, economic, and social climate is likely not the
kind of crime that would warrant a court tipping the balance in favor of
admission to preserve the fabric of the justice system. The same may not be
true for crimes of terrorism.302
Finding a solution that preserves constitutional integrity while providing
avenues for necessary police investigation, especially of covert crimes that
occur in very private, inaccessible places, should be the overall solution. That
the Court in Oliver took a politically expedient route is not altogether
surprising given its lack of options (i.e., a majority not willing to overturn the
exclusionary rule). But the present day abuses of the open fields doctrine and
the spectre of future abuses as technology advances should prompt a
reassessment of the doctrine. An open fields doctrine consistent with the
requirements of Katz, combined with the relaxed application of the
exclusionary rule, would leave the Court with a stronger Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that would not open the jailhouse door.

301. The defendants in Oliver and Vankesteren gave substantial indications of their
subjective expectation of privacy and society traditionally has honored the kind of privacy that
they sought to preserve.
302. In fact, there is an argument that the Court might actually encourage constitutional
violations to preserve overall public safety; that is, deterrence is not the goal, and the Court
should specifically encourage police to violate the Fourth Amendment. See New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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